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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this project was to study the way a person thought about other 
members of his social group. The primary goal was to discover whether people organized 
others similarly. Secondarily, personality aspects from other studies were tested to see if 
they were the organizing principles used in person perception.
To study person perception in naturally occurring intact groups, freshmen living 
clusters were recruited to participate in the current study. Each person rated other group 
members according to how similar pairs of people seemed. Next they defined what 
characteristics they used to judge similarity and rated group members on each characteristic, 
as well as four mandatory characteristics.
Multidimensional scaling techniques were applied to examine the relationships 
among people in each group. The similarity ratings revealed that each person’s 
conceptualization of the group was distinct and that anywhere from 2 to 4 dimensions were 
necessary to explain individuals’ data adequately. The ratings revealed that the mandatory 
characteristics were quite important in explaining individual configurations.
Similar characteristics were used by people to organize their social environment, but 
each person had a different view of how people in their group rated on each characteristic. 
Thus, people’s perceptions of others in their group were similar in some ways but could 
not be considered the same. People perceived others idiosyncratically, but used similar 
dimensions to organize people in general.
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN PERSON PERCEPTION
INTRODUCTION
The study of person perception is important in understanding social phenomena, 
because what we perceive influences how we interact with others. Social perception begins 
when a person observes another’s behavior or hears a description of someone (Rosenberg 
& Sedlak, 1972). It is theorized that people generalize the traits and behavior to 
experiences with other people who had those traits or displayed that behavior. Perception 
is facilitated and affected by stored knowledge from prior social contact. Prior knowledge 
about people and situations allow social perceivers to make sense of new encounters. It 
would be difficult to understand and remember new information without drawing on 
abstracted general knowledge about how the world works and filling in where information 
is missing or ambiguous (Schneider, Hastorf & Ellsworth, 1979). When a perceiver has to 
process a great deal of information about several people, there may be a tendency to
simplify the process by storing information in terms of categories rather than in terms of
/
individuals (Fiske & Taylor, 1984). Accumulated knowledge about categories of'people 
does not do justice to the unique qualities of any given individual, but it makes possible a 
certain efficiency and adaptiveness in social perception.
Asch’s work on impression formation began a large body of research on trait 
inference and centrality. Building on this, schema theory and prototypes developed as 
models for cognitive organization and information processing. Separately, implicit 
personality theory accounted for the perception of stable traits in others and the associations 
among these traits. It is this conceptualization of the constructive inner-workings of 
individuals which is important in the present project.
Traditionally, research on person perception has focused on laboratory studies.
This experimental approach may not be as informative as more naturalistic research
2
3methods. An alternative to laboratory methods is multidimensional scaling. This is a non- 
manipulative assessment technique, which allows a person to define their organization of a 
group and describe the principles underlying this organization. The present project used 
multidimensional scaling to learn about individuals’ organization of their social group. The 
goals were to determine whether people in the same group organized members similarly 
and to glean the personality traits underlying their cognitive organization.
Early Research on Impression Formation
Solomon Asch was a pioneer in the area of person perception, investigating how 
people combined isolated impressions of an individual’s personality and came up with an 
integrated overall perception (Schneider, Hastorf & Ellsworth, 1979). Asch (1946) studied 
impression formation using personality descriptions. He presented subjects with a list of 
traits (intelligent, skillful, industrious, determined, practical, cautious), including either 
“warm” or “cold” in the set. Subjects were then asked how the stimulus person rated on 
other properties. The results showed that the warm-cold aspect had a drastic effect on 
people’s perceptions. Subjects who saw the “warm” list judged the stimulus to be 
generous and good-natured, whereas subjects who saw the “cold” list reported th^t the 
stimulus did not have these qualities. Conversely, both “warm” and “cold” lists evoked the 
qualities of reliable and important. This established the importance of context in trait 
inference.
Asch set forth two ways that an impression might form. The configural model 
proposes that traits have meaning only with their context. This model suggests that a final 
impression is made up of traits and relationships among the traits. In contrast, the additive 
model is an example of an elemental approach to social cognition. Individual traits are 
evaluated independently of one another and then judgments are combined into a summary 
impression. Asch favored the configural model, believing that the process of forming 
impressions was a Gestalt, which could not be understood by analyzing the parts. Each 
trait affects or combines with the others and the final impression is a dynamic one not easily
4predicted from the individual traits taken separately. In his conceptualization, the stimulus 
traits produced a coherent impression which in turn led to further inferences about the 
stimulus person (stimulus traits-impression-response inferences). Stimulus traits are the 
ones that a person is given and response traits are the ones the person generates or infers. 
He believed that the formation of the impression enabled the perceiver to generate new 
information.
Asch pioneered another direction of research: trait centrality. He believed that in 
many impressions there are central traits or pieces of information about the stimulus person 
that tend to dominate the impression. These central traits organize the other traits and 
influence their meaning. Asch solicited open-ended responses from subjects about how 
they organized perceptual information. Their descriptions suggested that certain traits were 
central in the formation of their overall impression.
Trait Theory
Two research directions developed from Asch’s work. They are trait covariation or 
inference, which seeks evidence that the trait relationships which exist in people’s minds 
really exist in the social world, and trait centrality, which seeks to predict what subjects will 
infer from a given list of stimulus traits. Wishner (1960) studied the relationships among 
traits by performing correlations on 53 of Asch’s traits. Wishner found that the 
correlations of “warm” and “cold” with response traits predicted how much response traits 
were affected by the inclusion of “warm” or “cold” in the stimulus list. Wishner’s findings 
were two-fold; the traits people will infer can be predicted from the traits they are given and 
the central ttait has a high correlation with the response traits.
Wishner found that the centrality of a trait did not depend on what other stimulus 
traits were given but primarily on what the subject was asked to infer. His predictions 
were not always perfect, which suggests that several stimulus ttaits may have been central 
or centrality was determined by context. Whether a given trait is central or peripheral in the 
formation of an impression may depend on its context, on what other traits are presented
5(Schneider, Hastorf & Ellsworth, 1979). Some traits seem to have particular power to 
imply other traits independently of stimulus context (Schneider, Hastorf & Ellsworth, 
1979). These powerful traits relate to internal, stable attributes and overall disposition.
Zanna and Hamilton (1972) found further evidence for trait centrality. They studied 
two dimensions, namely intellectual and social desirability. They classified 60 traits as 
either socially desirable or undesirable and intellectually desirable or undesirable, based on 
a previous study by Rosenberg, Nelson and Vivekananthan (1968). They reasoned that 
when socially relevant traits were varied in the stimulus list, there would be greater effects 
on the responses of other social traits. They found that when a stimulus person was 
described as warm (a socially desirable trait), people inferred other positive social traits, 
such as popular or good-natured. The results of this study showed that the centrality of a 
trait is dependent to some extent on the response traits.
There is evidence that perceptual processes are subject to selective perception 
(Bruner & Krech, 1950), distortion (Bruner & Goodman, 1947), biasing (Lorge, 1936), 
and selective forgetting (Meltzer, 1930). Thorndike (1920) found that subjects ascribed 
positive characteristics to stimuli with a positive description; he called this the “hajo effect.” 
Nisbett & Wilson’s (1977) study corroborated this finding. They showed subjects a filmed 
interview with a professor who acted either cold and hostile or warm and genial. Subjects 
judged the warm professor as more physically attractive, even though the professor’s 
appearance in both films was the same.
Research has focused on whether people’s trait associations are realistic, whether 
pairs or groups of traits actually occur together in the general population. Studies have 
shown that perceived U*ait relationships do not mirror actual relationships. For example, 
Mirels (1976) presented subjects with statements about a person and they grouped traits 
they thought would go together. He compared these grouped traits with whether these 
statements actually went together in people’s estimation of themselves. For example, the 
two statements “My work is carefully planned and organized before it is begun,” and “My
6papers are always neat,” were perceived to co-occur 92 percent of the time. But only 44 
percent of people who endorsed the first proposition actually endorsed the second. Thus, 
people’s ideas about trait covariation did not match their self-report about trait covariation.
Further, in studies of people’s ability to estimate relationships among stimuli and 
events, the data suggest the estimates are subject to significant bias. A phenomenon that 
shows this clearly is the “illusory correlation,” coined by Chapman and Chapman (1967). 
They found that people infer associations in word pairs when these associations were not 
given. Subjects saw several word pairs a varying number of times and were later asked 
how often certain word pairs had occurred. Unusual words were judged to go together 
more often than they actually had. Also, words that had a common association (bacon- 
eggs) were paired even though they had not been presented together.
Two studies which claimed support for perceiver accuracy were done by Lay and 
Jackson (1969) and Strieker, Jacobs, and Kogan (1974). Both studies had subjects 
generate salient aspects in their perception of others. They found a high correspondence 
between the dimensions that perceivers used in making personality ratings and their actual 
responses to a personality inventory. Thus, there may be some correspondence between 
our perceptions of trait relationships in others and the actual measured relationships 
between U'aits in others, but there is also evidence which contradicts perceptual accuracy. It 
is possible that people are sensitive to the actual covariation of characteristics and 
behaviors, but there is abundant evidence that they often assume stronger relationships than 
the evidence warrants (Schneider, Hastorf & Ellsworth, 1979).
Since most research on trait inference has used written words to describe 
personality ttaits, the possibility arises that trait co-occurrence might simply be the 
grouping of and relationships among words. Peabody (1967) attempted to distinguish 
between the names of traits and the personality characteristics they represent. He varied the 
connotative, evaluative aspects of words and the denotative, descriptive aspects of words. 
He formed quartets of words with two positive and two negative traits, such as bold and
7cautious vs. rash and timid. Then he presented one term to subjects and asked which other 
words were implied by that word. If the subjects used the evaluative over the descriptive 
meaning of traits, like grouping “bold” and “cautious” more than “bold” and “rash,” then 
personality traits would be better explained by semantic organization. Peabody found that 
the inferences subjects made were based more on denotation and content, than on 
connotation. Thus, there is evidence that trait co-occurrence research has investigated 
personality descriptors instead of semantic groupings.
Social Schemata and Prototypes
Along with trait theory, researchers have proposed another theoretical cognitive 
model called social schemata. Schemata are theoretical cognitive structures which help 
people organize perceptions of themselves and their environment. A schema contains both 
the attributes of the concept and the relationships among the attributes. There are several 
types of social schemata, as described by Fiske and Taylor (1984). Person schemata 
encompass the traits and goals that shape other people’s behavior and the complex 
personality of typical or specific individuals. Self schemata contain information about 
one’s own personality, appearance and behavior. Role schemata pertain to knowledge 
about broad social categories, such as age, race sex or occupation. They include 
information which places the individual in society. Event schemata are the shared 
understandings of what typically happens on certain occasions.
Schema theory has enriched the field of social cognition, by providing explicit 
models of cognitive structure in impression formation (Fiske & Taylor, 1984). 
Categorization researchers independently developed theories similar to schema theory, 
which have also been useful in social cognition research. Cantor and Mischel (1977) 
suggested that prototypes serve to organize impressions. Knowledge about a category is 
composed of a typical or ideal instance, accompanied by the full range of peripheral or less 
good examples. There are differences between prototypes and schemata (Fiske & Taylor, 
1984). Prototypes have known attributes even if all the attributes are not directly relevant
8to category membership. In contrast, a schema permits some features to be unspecified. 
Because of this flexibility, a schema is a more efficient representation than a prototype. It 
has fewer details and is more focused on the essentials of category membership (Anderson, 
1980; Mandler, 1979).
Implicit Personality Theory
Trait theory and schema theory are cognitive models people use to navigate the 
social world. People form individual belief systems automatically and use these theories to 
aid in social processing. Asch’s position that people form an overall impression which 
cannot be understood by studying its components was countered by the emergence of 
implicit personality theory. Bruner & Tagiuri (1954) held that inferences were made based 
on the information given without the formation of a holistic impression. They proposed 
implicit personality theory, which is the network of trait associations that people have.
This network is made up of interrelationships among traits. Certain dispositional traits 
function as organizing themes under which other trait connections fall. Implicit personality 
theory is defined as the set of assumptions a perceiver makes about the relationships among 
traits. They suggested that inferences are generated by a naive sense people have p f which 
characteristics go with other characteristics. They thought that people make judgments by 
inferring other traits that accompany the traits they are given. Implicit personality theory 
accounts for the perception of stable physical and psychological characteristics, or the traits 
that people perceive as characteristic of themselves and of others (Rosenberg & Sedlak, 
1972). Elements of people’s implicit theories are traits, behaviors, style of dress, 
nonverbal cues and physical characteristics (Schneider, 1973).
Categorizing people and making inferences about them point to an important 
cognitive truth, namely how we go beyond the information given. Without the ability to do 
this, we would forever be stuck at a concrete level of thinking about others (Schneider, 
Hastorf & Ellsworth, 1979). These over-generalizations about the behavior of single­
stimulus persons over time probably result from our need to impose stability on the
9behavior of others (Fiske & Taylor, 1984). Reliance on one’s own understanding of 
people provides the sense of prediction and control which are critical to one’s well-being 
(Fiske & Taylor, 1984).
Thus far, the investigation of accuracy in trait co-occurrence does not address the 
development of a  person’s implicit personality theory. This would entail assessing trait 
covariation in the population periodically and assessing the person’s theory at the same 
interval. A delay might be found in the actual and the perceived. Probably, the implicit 
personality theory that one holds develops gradually through experience and changes with 
exposure to new trait associations. There may be a delay in the accuracy of a person’s 
theory when compared to current data on trait co-occurrence, but it may have been accurate 
6 months ago. It is important to note that regardless of whether people’s assumptions are 
founded in reality, they need implicit personality theories to facilitate processing of new 
information. These theories are the best estimate of others that a person has at any one 
time.
Multidimensional Scaling Methods and Research
Many researchers in social psychology have used an experimental approach to 
studying social perception. This involves manipulating the variables of interest in the 
laboratory and removing people from their social context. They have looked for universal 
principles that underlie all social interaction and have used group analysis to substantiate 
their theories. While much has been learned, this approach has its limitations because the 
outcome does not necessarily describe naturally occurring interactions or group 
organization by its members. The naturalistic approach is potentially more valuable in 
understanding person perception, because it attends to how the naive observer perceives 
others and organizes the social world in which he or she lives.
To elicit information from people about the inner workings of their perception in a 
naturalistic way, multidimensional scaling (MDS) has been a useful technique. People’s 
responses reflect how they organize others and the dimensions they use to evaluate them.
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These techniques for data collection and analysis are important for studying individuals’ 
perceptions, because there is no manipulation of the stimuli by the experimenter. The only 
order of the stimuli being studied is imposed by the perceiver, as long as pairs are 
presented in random order. It begins with the selection of a set of interrelated entities. 
Subjects rate all possible pairs of objects in the set on the basis of similarity. The data form 
a matrix of numbers reflecting how closely each pair of entities are related. The more traits 
or people being judged, the more complicated the matrix and number of relationships.
Thus, it is beneficial to find a parsimonious representation of those relationships, using the 
fewest dimensions possible while still explaining the relationships.
An example of multidimensional scaling techniques that pertains to trait implications 
is a study by Rosenberg, Nelson and Vivekananthan (1968). They had subjects place 60 
traits into piles representing people, and then calculated the co-occurrences or distances 
among the traits based on how often any two traits were placed together. Then using an 
MDS procedure, they found the underlying dimensions of the distances. Some of the traits 
appeared close together, which were traits that subjects tended to see as related or used to 
describe the same person. The trait distances all appeared in two dimensions, whjch were
r
named “intellectual” and “social,” with a positive and negative pole for each. However, the 
two dimensions were not at right angles to one another, meaning they were related. 
Generally good social traits were also generally positive intellectual traits.
Another study pertaining to traits was conducted by Wish, Deutsch and Kaplan 
(1976). They studied the perception of actual and stereotypic role relationships. They 
found four dimensions were needed to explain the multidimensional scaling solution.
These dimensions were cooperative and friendly vs. competitive and hostile, equal vs. 
unequal, intense vs. superficial, informal or socio-emotional vs. formal and task oriented. 
They also found that the relative importance of these dimensions varied systematically 
across various subgroups based on biographical characteristics of the subjects.
Another study which focused on the dimensions used in social perception was
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conducted by Forgas (1976). He studied situation perception in samples of housewives 
and college students in England. Each group generated social episodes common in their 
daily lives and each subject judged the similarity among their respective situations. Using 
multidimensional scaling techniques, he found that the two samples used similar 
dimensions to organize different social situations. Some universal dimensions were found 
even though ratings of these dimensions varied given individual perceptions. The 
dimensions were: intimacy, involvement, self-confidence and knowing how to behave. 
Among the student sample, “pleasantness” was interpreted as a dimension important to the 
solution.
In another study of college students, similar dimensions were found to underlie 
college students’ judgments of college situations. Battistich and Thompson (1980) 
examined the properties of the college environment, so that college students’ perceptions 
could be better understood. They collected similarity data on 30 representative social 
situations, which were determined by student diaries. These situations described aspects 
of college life, such as studying, dating, eating, relaxing and playing sports. Also, 
subjects rated each situation on 38 properties and described what their behavior and affect 
would be in each situation.
Using KYST to determine the multidimensional scaling solution, the authors 
decided that four dimensions were necessary to describe the similarity data based on a 
stress value of 0.5. They found the first dimension to distinguish situations primarily in 
terms of the emotional involvement between individuals, or interpersonal intimacy. This 
dimension roughly divided situations into academic and social ones, but this did not 
describe the dimension consistently. The second dimension was described by group 
versus individual activities, with sports and parties having large positive loadings and 
taking an exam having a negative loading on this dimension. Social isolation was the 
interpretation for the third dimension, which involves the individual in the presence of 
others being isolated or detached. The fourth dimension was interpreted as behavioral
12
conformity, with polite versus impolite, dominant versus submissive, and cautious versus 
reckless organizing situations on this dimension. These results display more subjective, 
connotative qualities instead of structural, objective characteristics. Interpersonal 
characteristics were more salient to these college students than physical setting or particular 
activities. The emotional relationship between individuals was a major distinction made by 
students. The main problem with these results is the group solution had a stress value of 
0.5 and should not have been accepted. When stress is high, individual solutions or 
subgroups may be the best way to describe the data.
Before this study, Magnusson (1971) found five common grouping of situations in 
a small sample of Swedish college students: positive and rewarding, negative, passiveness, 
social interaction and individual activity. The importance of affective reactions is apparent 
in the first two factors, while the latter three factors are similar to the group versus 
individual activity dimension found by Battistich and Thompson (1980). However, 
Magnusson failed to assess the relevance of the stimulus situations to subjects. Pervin 
(1976) also noted the importance of affective reactions and behavioral constraints in 
distinguishing situations in his idiographic analysis of four college students’ free-jresponse 
situation descriptions. The limitations of this study were the small number of subjects and 
a methodology which did not allow comparison among individual subjects.
Even though multidimensional scaling studies use a naturalistic approach, there are 
several problems evident in some of these studies on person perception (Rosenberg & 
Sedlak, 1972). These problems include: experimenter identification of dimensions, small 
sample sizes, high stress values, group solutions instead of individual or subgroup 
solutions, generalization of results to the population, and stimulus sets made up of traits or 
situations instead of people. Dimensions have been statistically identified but arbitrarily 
described by the experimenter. There has been very little attention to subject interpretation 
of underlying dimensions. This poses a problem because of the discrepancy that may exist 
between what the experimenter concludes and what subjects intended by their answers.
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Rosenberg, Nelson and Vivekananthan (1968) showed that a two-dimensional space 
interpreted in terms of good-bad and hard-soft could be interpreted equally well in terms of 
intellectual desirability and social desirability. The procedure for fitting trait properties is 
useful in eliminating completely redundant or poorly fitting trait properties but provides no 
basis for choosing from among alternative interpretations. Schneider (1973) suggested that 
further attention should be given to the comparison of subject-generated dimensions.
Schneider also encouraged the use of stimulus persons instead of just traits in 
similarity scaling research. Generality becomes a problem when stimulus sets are 
artificially formulated. In the past, they have been defined by the experimenter instead of 
drawn from the natural environment. This experimental control hinders the investigation of 
natural processes of perception. Another problem in some studies is the small sample size. 
The number of subjects in MDS studies must be large enough, so that results are reliable 
instead of idiosyncratic and misleading. Another flaw in the methods used is the high 
stress levels accepted. When stress of an MDS solution is relatively high, researchers 
should look at the possibility of individual solutions or subgroups.
Some of these problems were addressed in a study by Jones & Young (19/72).
They studied person perception in an intact group and a naturalistic setting, using group 
members as the stimulus set. They found that the relative salience of certain perceptual 
dimensions was closely related to independent information about the perceivers. They 
asked the faculty and graduate students of their psychology department to rate all possible 
pairs of the lab members according to their similarity, taking into account “whatever 
characteristics of the individuals that are relevant for making similarity judgments.” They 
found that members of the department were judged to vary on three dimensions identified 
as status, professional interests, and political persuasion. For faculty members, status was 
more salient than professional interests, while for graduate students the reverse was true. 
These are interesting findings, because individual perceptions were assessed and perceiver 
correlates accounted for the importance of different dimensions.
14
Other parts of the study are problematic. Jones and Young found that people 
organize the same group similarly. This is not surprising, since roles and hierarchy were 
evident in the group, even before data were collected. In this group, as in many graduate 
departments, there is an established order which people accept and by which they organize 
others. The external hierarchy is imposed on members of the group and their roles are 
predetermined. Their stimulus set could have included only one level of the hierarchy and 
offered much more information on naturally ordered groups and personality traits. Also, 
they could have studied more than one graduate department to make sure their results were 
reliable. Though Jones and Young’s study explored individual perceptions of an intact 
group in the natural environment, several problems with the literature on multidimensional 
scaling still remain.
Nomothetic vs. Idiographic Approaches
Results from prior studies have been based on group analyses, whereas more 
individual analysis might be useful. Attention to characteristics of the perceiver reveal that 
certain variables account for perceptual differences among people. Perception and stored 
knowledge are not always accurate and this distortion has been explained by perceiver 
correlates. Categorization, generalization and inference are helpful in processing 
information about an unknown other, but can also hinder the process. These processes are 
similar to stereotypes, because they involve making assumptions about a person based on a 
limited amount of information. Bias and misjudgment can result in discrimination against 
racial, cultural, gender, and age groups. Selective attention is the filtering process that 
stimuli undergo during perception.. Attention is influenced by many internal variables, 
such as temporary mental states, disposition, age, culture, and beliefs. External variables 
guide attention, also. For example, social cues and context have dramatic effects on what 
is perceived and ignored.
The implicit personality theories which result are surprisingly rigid and once 
established are difficult to change (Cantor & Mischel, 1979). People’s beliefs are resilient
15
and difficult to change, even when evidence contradicts their beliefs. For example, Berman 
& Kenny (1976) exposed subjects to a number of stimulus persons, each defined by a pair 
of traits. Some subjects saw a stimulus person who exhibited two traits that generally go 
together or imply each other, while other stimulus people exhibited one trait and an 
unrelated trait. When subjects rated these stimulus persons, traits that had been presented 
together were seen as more highly related than those that had not gone together. But when 
asked which traits should go together, they maintained their prior assumptions about trait 
relationships, even though they had just been exposed to “people” who were different. 
Similarly, Markus (1977) found that self-schemata were very stable and not easily 
influenced. When subjects rated themselves highly on a trait, they tended to reject 
contrived information that was inconsistent with their self-views. This suggests that 
people’s implicit personality theories are very stable as they pertain to the self and others.
It may be difficult for people to change their ideas about others when faced with 
information that is not accounted for by their current schemata (Cantor & Mischel, 1979). 
Some researchers have explained inaccuracy in people’s perceptions and cognition by 
postulating inner states, such as exploration (Montgomery, 1954), curiosity (Berlyne,
1955, 1960), intolerance for ambiguity (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levenson & Sanford, 
1950), desire for uncertainty reduction (Berlyne, 1957), avoidance of cognitive conflict 
(Allport, 1937), and open/closed minds (Rokeach, 1960). Possibly, certain experiences or 
ways of looking at things make it more difficult to modify schema. People may not have 
flexible constructs to begin with, or because of unknown variables have a difficult time 
accepting incongruous information. Disconfirming or incongruent information requires 
more effort to process than congruent information and for this reason maybe ignored.
When the effort is made, the new information will be remembered (Cantor & Mischel, 
1979).
Distortion in perception has been given a great amount of attention, to predict bias 
given characteristics of the perceiver or the situation. Rogers and his colleagues (Rogers,
16
Kuiper, and Kirker, 1977) found that self-pertinent information affected perception and 
improved recall. They presented subjects with a list of traits and asked them questions 
about the words, such as: Were they printed in small or large letters? Did one rhyme with 
another? and Did one word mean the same as another? Also, they were asked if certain 
traits described themselves. Recall was best for those traits which they had to judge as 
self-relevant or not. Within this group of words recalled, more were traits that the subject 
identified as self-relevant. Thus, people are more likely to observe and remember self­
relevant characteristics and behavior in others.
Distortion can be accounted for by stable values and attitudes, as well as temporary 
mental states. Wish, Deutsch and Biener (1970) found that attributes of the perceiver 
accounted for individual differences. They studied the impact of political stance on nation 
perception using multidimensional scaling techniques. They asked subjects to rate 
similarity of 21 countries and also assessed each subject’s political stance on the war in 
Vietnam. Based on the data, they named three dimensions that seemed to organize the 
MDS solution - political alignment, Pro-Western vs. Pro-Communist, and economic 
development. “Hawks,” people who supported fighting in Vietnam, gave greater^weight to 
political alignment with the United States, while “doves” used economic development as an 
organizing dimension, in their similarity judgments of nations. Sherman and Ross (1972) 
asked subjects to judge the similarity of political figures. Whether the politician was a 
“hawk” or “dove” and whether they were acceptable as a presidential candidate seemed to 
be the organizing dimensions. The subject’s liberalism was measured and was found to 
predict how salient these dimensions were to the subject.
Similarly, Wiggins, Hoffman, and Taber (1969) found that differences in 
perception could be accounted for by perceiver attributes. Subjects were asked to rate the 
intelligence of a number of hypothetical students, given such information as grades, 
aptitude tests, study habits, and responsibility. The researchers also evaluated the subjects 
themselves on intelligence and authoritarianism. Subjects used different information to
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determine the intelligence of the stimulus persons and the information they used could be 
predicted by their level of intelligence and authoritarianism.
Situational variables have been shown to affect perception. Sherman (1973) 
manipulated whether subjects expected to cooperate or compete after making political 
judgments. He found that “hawk-dove” differences were strongest when subjects expected 
to cooperate. O’Neal (1971) studied cognitive sets which affected perception. He asserted 
that people need to be more certain about people they will interact with than with those they 
will not. He found that trait correlations for a stimulus person were higher when subjects 
anticipated meeting the person they were rating.
In addition, George Kelly (1963) argued that a great deal about a person is revealed 
in how that person categorizes others and the constructs he uses to describe his 
interpersonal world. A construct is the way any two things are similar and different from a 
third. Constructs can be pairs of traits or a set of related traits. They are similar to 
categories, schemata and prototypes. Kelly points out that even when people seem to use a 
similar trait to describe another person, it does not mean they perceive the person in the 
same way. Allport (1937) introduced the distinction between idiographic (individual case) 
and nomothetic (universal principle) approaches to psychology. He advocated that 
researchers pay more attention to individuals and the information each person can provide. 
The study of concrete individuals is useful, theoretically interesting and until recently 
neglected in psychology (Fiske & Taylor, 1984).
In keeping with this, Jaccard & Dittus (1990) point out that inferences drawn from 
group behavior do not necessarily lead to an understanding of specific individuals. Also, if 
social settings are hypothetical or created in the lab, they may be different from what occurs 
naturally; an arbitrary grouping may not reflect what occurs in the world. The distinction 
between the nomothetic and idiographic approaches to psychology is an important one. 
Idiography is the study of individuals using methods which elicit their understanding of 
psychological phenomena. Nomothetic principles are used in studying what is similar
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about all people. They argued that none of the current approaches to social psychological 
research were satisfactory. For example, the case study provides great detail about an 
individual, but cannot be generalized to a group; group analyses allows group means to 
characterize individuals’ behavior in groups. They propose a new theory and empirical 
system using both nomothetic and idiographic methods. They emphasize the need for more 
studies of individual differences within social groups, with attention to similarities among 
individual results.
Because group analyses are not necessarily the most accurate description of the 
individuals comprising the group, the idiographic approach provides a different perspective 
on person perception research. Studies have shown that people perceive the same object 
differently and that this can be predicted by assessing self-relevant information. By greater 
attention to individual differences, predictions about person perception may become more 
accurate. Individual differences should be an object of study, instead of a problem 
requiring experimental control.
More idiographic methods of research have been established and offer a means of 
understanding person perception from an individual’s point of view. For example, 
Rosenberg (1977) used multidimensional scaling techniques to study individual implicit 
personality theories. Unlike other scientists using these methods, Rosenberg began 
intensive analysis of single perceivers. He elicited the stimulus people and traits or feelings 
which might apply to them from individual subjects. Then each trait or feeling was rated 
for applicability to each stimulus person. To analyze the data, he used both 
multidimensional scaling and clustering techniques, so that clusters rather than individual 
traits were represented in the multidimensional space. His techniques allow a researcher to 
spot various interesting and unique clusters that may provide insights into individual 
personality, not to mention person perception processes.
Present Project
The current study was conducted in an attempt to better understand how people
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think about their friends and what dimensions they use to organize their social 
relationships. This project sought to describe how individual group members organized 
and thought about the other members of their group. An important question asked was 
whether individuals organize their group similarly. One of the difficulties in previous 
studies was that people’s roles were defined by the situation (Jones & Young, 1972). 
Studying these groups did not reveal what was important about people’s personalities, but 
what was defined by the social situation. It was important to find a group in which roles 
and norms did not define the order. The participants as well as the stimuli were from 
naturally occurring, intact social groups on the college campus, specifically freshmen living 
clusters. Freshmen were ideal for the study because they were new to the college 
environment and did not yet know the norms of the student body. Their roles and norms 
were not yet formalized and any order in the group was defined by its members. The 
design and procedures were non-manipulative, in an attempt to understand each person’s 
idiosyncratic cognitive organization of others in their group.
People’s perceptions of others were assessed using multidimensional scaling 
techniques. Subjects judged the similarity of every possible pair of people in their group, 
using their own definition of similarity. These data were used to formulate individual 
configurations, or cognitive maps of group members. These maps were intended to 
represent the way that people arranged group members in relation to one another. Free- 
response was encouraged when participants were deciding on the characteristics they used 
to judge similarity. These characteristic ratings helped clarify what each person’s definition 
of similarity involved. Also, the characteristics were analyzed to see the extent to which 
they could be mapped onto a person’s MDS configuration.
This project attempted to determine the underlying personality aspects used to 
organize people. Other studies have claimed that certain aspects are important in person 
perception. For example, Falbo (1977) found that power was an important element in 
interaction and the cognitive organization of others. This suggests that a prominent feature
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in perception is the degree to which a person is controlling or manipulative in social 
interaction. Whereas, Forgas (1976) found that pleasantness was important in the 
perception of others in a college population. Also, students as well as housewives paid 
attention to whether people were conventional and “knew how to behave.” Finally, Wish, 
Deutsch and Kaplan (1972) found that intimacy and friendliness were salient aspects in the 
perception of others. From these studies, four questions were formed which asked 
subjects about how controlling, friendly, conventional and open each group member was. 
These mandatory ratings could then be analyzed for their importance in defining solutions.
It was hypothesized that they would be very helpful in explaining the cognitive 
frameworks.
In sum, the present study investigated individuals’ perceptions of their social 
environment, to see whether individual configurations were similar within groups and to 
determine the underlying dimensions in these configurations.
METHOD
Subjects
Freshmen living groups at the College of William & Mary were recruited on the 
basis of group size and sex. Groups of approximately 20 freshmen, living on a single sex 
hall, met the criteria. Two male halls with 20 and 25 members and two female halls with 
20 and 21 members agreed to take part. Each hall was paid $75 for group participation. 
Participants were between 18 and 19 years of age. Each group had lived together for 5 to 6 
months when data collection began.
Questionnaires were completed at the end of the study, which suggested that the 
four groups were made up of similar kinds of people. These data are presented in Table 1. 
For the four groups, 47% of people were dating someone steadily and 31% were in a 
fraternity or sorority. Generally, people were active on their hall, considered most of the 
group members “friends,” and were satisfied with their relationships in high school and in 
college. Groups had similar means for all of the questions about friendships, but there was 
a great amount of variability among individuals’ answers. Correlational relationships were 
found among the questions. People who were active on their hall were happier in their 
same-sex relationships (r=0.55, p<0.01, n-64) and opposite-sex relationships (r=0.28, 
p<0.05, n=64) people. Those who were happy with their opposite-sex relationships in 
high school were also happier with their opposite-sex relationships at present (r=0.31, 
p<0.05, n=64). People who were satisfied with their opposite-sex relationships were also 
dating someone steadily (r=0.31, p<0.05, n=64).
Procedure
MDS data for the multidimensional scaling analysis were collected via computer, 
with subjects working individually. The testing consisted of similarity judgments and
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TABLE 1
Summary of Questionnaire Responses
QUESTI ON
How socially active 
are you with people 
on your hall?
(9 is very active)
How satisfied were you 
in high school in your 
relationships with the 
same sex?
(9 is very satisfied)
How satisfied were you 
in high school in your 
relationships with the 
opposite sex?
(9 is very satisfied)
How satisfied are you 
now in your relationships 
with the same sex?
(9 is very satisfied)
How satisfied are you 
now in your relationships 
with the opposite sex?
(9 is very satisfied)
Are you dating someone 
steadily right now?
(% of yes answers)
Are you involved in a 
fraternity or sorority?
(% of yes answers)
Which people in your 
group would you consider 
your friend?
(% of people selected)
GROUP  
1 2  3 4
6.0 6.7 6.2 6.6
6.4 6.1 6.8 7.6
7.3 5.8 7.1 6.0
6.9 7.7 6.7 7.2
6.7 7.1 7.3 6.7
68.4 57.4 66.5 61.1
53.3 47.0 50.1 39.2
26.7 31.3 28.6 38.9
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bipolar ratings, which were presented by a program called PCISIS (Null & Sarle, 1982). 
The first segment of the study was the similarity scoring program, which generated all 
possible pairs [n(n-l)/2] of members in the living group and presented them in random 
order. For a group of 20 members, this resulted in 190 comparisons, plus 10 repeated 
pairs used to determine reliability. Subjects rated the similarity of each pair of people along 
an 80-point scale, with lower numbers indicating greater similarity (see Appendix B). 
Subjects were not given definition for judging similarity. To answer, they moved the 
cursor along a continuum until they reached a point between the endpoints marked “similar'* 
and “dissimilar” which best described their perception of that pair. The continuum did not 
display numbers, but points along the line corresponded to 0 through 80.
The second part of the study was a rating program, which involved rating each 
person on chosen (voluntary) and required (mandatory) personality traits (see Appendix 
C). Subjects were asked to reveal three features that they used when rating people on 
similarity. After subjects entered their answers, they were shown a list of 14 other 
descriptors (Good Sense of Humor, Religious, Introverted, Well Adjusted, Athletic, Hard 
to Get Along With, Academically Oriented, Reserved, Physically Attractive, Intelligent, 
Argumentative, Interesting, Anxious, Manipulative). The aspects, which were collected 
from current literature (Forgas, 1976; Battistich & Thompson, 1980; Wish, Deutsch & 
Kaplan, 1976), were personality variables salient in an academic and social context. From 
the list of 17, subjects chose what they thought had been the most important aspect used in 
their similarity judgments. Then each person’s name was presented to them and they rated 
people on this first aspect, given a continuum with the endpoints “a lot” and “a little”.
Again, each point on the line corresponded to a number between 0 and 80. The list of 17 
characteristics appeared again and they chose the second most important aspect used in their 
similarity judgments. The same procedure took place until they had chosen 4 aspects and 
rated everyone in the group on those aspects. Four mandatory traits were also presented, 
which were 1) How conventional is this person’s lifestyle and outlook? 2) How friendly or
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sociable is this person? 3) How much does this person control and influence social 
interaction? 4) How much does this person allow others to know him/her? These four 
aspects were based on Forgas’ (1976) and Battistich and Thompson’s (1980) findings on 
global aspects relevant to person perception in the college environment. Because standard 
traits were preseated, they could be analyzed for their importance in each person’s solution.
The last segment of the study involved filling out a two-page background 
questionnaire (see Appendix D). There were 7 questions asking about past and present 
friendships with same and opposite sex people, which subjects could respond to by giving 
a rating from 1 to 9, with 1 being “not at all satisfied” and 9 being “very satisfied”. On the 
second page, subjects were asked to rank order people in the group according to who their 
friends were. They indicated people whom they considered friends by placing a check next 
to their names and a zero next to the names of people whom they would not call friends.
After completing all parts of the study, subjects were debriefed, thanked for their 
participation and dismissed.
RESULTS
Reliability was measured by a built-in test in the similarity scoring program. As the 
pairs of stimuli were randomly generated, 10 random pairs were presented a second time. 
The correlation between the first and second answers for the 10 pairs was the measure used 
to judge a person’s overall reliability in answering. Each subject’s data reliability was 
calculated, to determine whether or not a subject answered with consistency. A correlation 
of at least 0.6 was required for a subject’s data to be included in further analysis, because a 
low correlation indicated that the subject may have reversed the scale at some point during 
the task or for some other reason given random answers. Group 1 represented one of four 
halls that participated in this study. This hall was all female, with 20 members, and 15 
subjects had reliable data. Group 2 was all female, with 21 members, 16 with reliable data. 
Group 3 was an all male hall with 20 members, 14 of whom had reliable data. Group 4 
was all male, with 25 members and 18 had reliable data. The overall reliability of subjects 
included in the following analyses was r=0.86, indicating that there may have beep some 
error in subjects’ responses but for the most part their similarity scoring was very 
consistent.
The similarity data were analyzed by one of several MDS analysis packages (Carroll 
& Chang, 1968; Takane, Young & deLeeuw, 1977; Null & Sarle, 1982). The analysis 
yielded a geometric configuration of the entities in which the distances corresponded to 
psychological relatedness. In a study of personality perception involving people as the 
entities to be scaled, the ratings reflect how similar people’s overall personalities seem. 
MDS transforms a matrix of numbers into a map of distances. The ease of understanding 
the layout of cities from a map compared to a table of numbers illustrates one benefit of 
using MDS procedures (Null, 1980).
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All MDS solutions are accompanied by the percent of variance explained, stress and 
a geometric configuration of the items scaled. Kruskal (1964) first calculated stress, which 
provides a measure of the goodness of fit of a solution. Stress decreases with increasing 
dimensionality, because the goodness of fit improves as more dimensions are used to 
represent the input data. Stress, variance explained, and interpretability of the 
configuration (items clustered instead of spread out) were important measures in 
determining how to characterize the data. When stress is low and R2 is high in a group 
solution, subjects have similar organization of stimuli. A strategy for judging the 
significance of a configuration produced by a multidimensional analysis is to compare 
stress and the variance explained by the individual and group solutions (Null & Bloch, 
1988).
Reliable data were first analyzed using ALSCAL (Takane, Young & deLeeuw, 
1977) from SAS (1982), which produced a group solution based on individuals’ similarity 
data. This analysis combined each group’s data and produced a map of the members with 
distance representing dissimilarity and proximity representing similarity. The outcome of 
the group analysis was similar for the four freshmen halls. The mean variance explained 
by a two dimensional solution was 32% and mean stress was 0.35. In three dimensions, 
the mean variance explained for the solutions was 34% and mean stress was 0.26. Stress 
was moderately high, but did decrease with the added dimension. Increasing dimensions 
did not greatly improve R2 and these low values were unacceptable. When variance 
accounted for is low, randomness and error are not within a reasonable range and the 
model’s assumptions are not met. The geometric configurations revealed a circular pattern 
in 2 and 3 dimensions. The configuration depicted group members equidistant from the 
origin. Group members were not organized along axes or clumped by similarity. When 
everyone’s data was combined, the similarity judgments averaged out and no one was 
especially similar or different from anyone else. The circular pattern resulted from 
complexity, indicating that the data could not be understood or interpreted using so few
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dimensions. Thus, group solutions did not adequately describe the data and individual 
solutions were pursued.
To determine the cognitive representations of individual group members, similarity 
ratings underwent a nonmetric individual differences model of MDS. ALSCAL was 
applied to the similarity data to determine individual solutions. The specifications for these 
analyses were that they have a rational, or Torsca start, an ordinal measurement level, data 
scaled by dissimilarity, and ties of primary, or.weak monotone function. This procedure 
mapped out the similarity data for each individual and was completed in 2, 3, and 4 
dimensions. These maps depicted clusters of members, reflecting similarity and difference 
in the organization. Table 2 displays the R2 and Stress values for each subject’s solution in 
2, 3 and 4 dimensions.
For 2-dimensional solutions, the overall means for R2 were m=0.67 (sd=0.11) and 
for stress, m=0.25 (sd=0.03). For 3-dimensions, the R2 m=0.75 (sd=0.09) and stress 
m=0.17 (sd=0.02). The 4 dimensional solution generated R2 m=0.81 (sd=0.07) and 
stress m=0.12 (sd=0.02). Stress dramatically decreased with each added dimension and 
R2 was much higher, also increasing with added dimensions. The display of the data was 
more interpretable, because solutions produced configurations of clusters, instead of 
circular patterns. For these reasons, it was decided that the individual solutions were most 
meaningful for describing the data, whereas the group solutions were not.
To test for subgroups of similar individual solutions, the program MOTION 
(Schonenmann & Carroll, 1970) was run. MOTION compared each individual solution to 
every other person’s solution and was completed in 3 dimensions. The program compared 
each of the subject’s three dimensions to every other person’s three dimensions, and 
calculated the degree of fit between the two solutions. When the normalized symmetric 
error for these comparisons is close to zero, there is similarity between that pair of 
solutions. The decision rule used for accepting a subgroup was an error term of less than 
0.3. When the error is 0.1 or 0.2, the solutions are sufficiently similar to form a subgroup.
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TABLE 2
Reliability for Each Subject and Stress and Variance Explained (R2) from ALSCAL 
Analysis for Individual Solutions in 2, 3, and 4 Dimensions
NUMBER OF DIM ENSIONS
2D 3D 4D
SU B JE C T S Rel Stress R2 Stress R2 Stress R2
GROUP 1
SPOIO .87 .20 .80 .14 .86 .11 .89
SPO ll .68 .27 .57 .18 .70 .13 .77
SP014 .94 .25 .69 .16 .80 .12 .84
SP016 .97 .27 .71 .18 .77 .13 .82
SP017 .80 .19 .83 .13 .87 .09 .91
SP018 .88 .25 .65 .17 .71 .13 .78
SP021 .93 .20 .83 .15 .86 .12 .89
SP022 .99 .17 .84 .10 .92 .05 .89
SP023 .70 .27 .58 .19 .67 .13 .75
SP024 .83 .24 .69 .17 .76 .13 .81
SP025 .89 .28 .54 .21 .60 .14 .70
SP026 .80 .25 .67 .17 .79 .12 .85
SP027 .93 .28 .54 .17 .69 .11 .79
SP028 .64 .28 .55 .18 .69 .13 .76
SP029 .95 .27 .65 .18 .71 .14 .77 /
GROUP 2
NIC10 .83 .26 .62 .17 .74 .12 .83
NIC 11 .83 .16 .85 .12 .89 .07 .94
NIC 12 .72 .25 .64' .17 .75 .12 .82
NIC 13 .83 .24 .68 .17 .73 .12 .81
NIC 14 .74 .27 .57 .17 .72 .13 .76
NIC 15 .97 .25 .64 .18 .69 .12 .79
NIC 17 .65 .28 .50 .19 .61 .14 .68
NIC 19 .94 .29 .51 .20 .61 .14 .72
NIC20 .77 .29 .56 .20 .64 .15 .67
NIC21 .71 .25 .67 .15 .80 .11 .85
NIC23 .98 .19 .81 .14 .85 .09 .91
NIC24 .94 .24 .70 .17 .74 .12 .82
NIC25 .97 .17 .86 .13 .88 .09 .93
NIC27 .89 .23 .71 .16 .79 .12 .84
NIC28 .81 .31 .43 .21 .54 .15 .67
NIC29 .95 .26. .58 .17 .68 .12 .76
NIC30 .99 ■ .25 .68 .17 .74 .12 .80
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TABLE 2 (continued)
NUMBER OF DIMENSIONS
2D 3D 4D
SUBJECTS Rel Stress R2 Stress R2 ■ Stress R2
GROUP 3
DIN 10 .86 .30 .49 .21 .62 .15 .71
DIN 11 .99 .27 .54 .20 .64 .14 .75
DIN 12 .92 .20 .80 .14 .86 .11 .88
D IN 13 .87 .26 .68 .17 .77 .12 .84
DIN 15 .70 .30 .52 .19 .71 .14 .78
DIN 17 .97 .25 .69 .18 .73 .13 .81
DIN21 .87 .26 .58 .18 .69 .12 .78
DIN23 .94 .21 .78 .15 .83 .12 .87
DIN24 .95 .26 .70 .17 .81 .12 .85
DIN25 .88 .20 .78 .14 .83 .10 .87
DIN26 .73 .20 .80 .13 .86 .10 .90
DIN27 .91 .24 .73 .19 .75 .14 .80
DIN28 .85 .28 .54 .19 .65 .14 .72
DIN29 .79 .27 .56 .18 .71 .12 .80
GROUP 4
YAT10 .85 .22 .75 .15 .81 .11
/
.87 '
YAT12 .89 .30 .52 .21 .60 .16 .67
YAT13 .82 .23 .77 .16 .83 .12 .88
YAT15 .94 .29 .54 .20 .64 .15 .71
YAT16 .95 .25 .69 .18 .74 .13 .80
YAT17 .90 .21 .76 .17 .78 .13 .81
YAT19 .93 .26 .64 .18 .70 .14 .77
YAT20 .95 .28 .58 .19 .65 .15 .69
YAT21 .95 .20 .87 .16 .88 .13 .89
YAT22 .97 .25 .65 .18 .72 .13 .79
YAT23 .98 .26 .60 .19 .68 .15 .71
YAT24 .74 .26 .62 .16 .78 .12 .84
YAT25 .62 .24 .68 .18 .73 .14 .75
YAT28 .91 .25 .72 .17 .80 .13 .84
YAT29 .75 .21 .76 .15 .81 .12 .84
YAT32 .97 .24 .69 .16 .77 .13 .82
YAT33 .78 .23 .77 .16 .85 .12 .89
YAT34 .77 .23 .73 .16 .78 .13 .80
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The error terms ranged from 0.38 to 0.86 and the mean value was 0.66 (sd=0.1) for all 
four groups. These values represented a poor fit of the individual solutions with others, 
suggesting that no two subjects conceptualized others in a similar manner. To illustrate 
this, Figure 1 and 2 depict two people’s solutions in 2 dimensions. It is clear that the 
arrangement of the group varies based on these two configurations. Thus, no pair of 
people had similar solutions and subgroups of solutions were not formed.
The next analysis compared the individual MDS configurations to the rating 
vectors. A weighted Euclidean model designed to rescale data for each subject was 
employed to account for both between-subject differences in person perception and 
subjects’ use of the rating scale. PROFIT (Chang & Carroll, 1968) was completed in 2, 3 
and 4 dimensions, which found the best fit of vectors with the dimensions used in each 
person’s configuration. This analysis determined which aspects aided in explaining the 
similarity configurations, based on the 4 voluntary aspects and the 4 mandatory aspects. 
This program projected the vectors of the personality aspects rated by subjects onto the 
MDS space and calculated a correlation for each rating vector. Fit was measured by the 
correlation between the ratings of people on a given aspect and their placement in fhe MDS 
space. These correlations represented the importance of each dimension in the MDS space. 
For purposes of clarity, these correlations will be referred to as Rho, or p, values to 
distinguish them from other correlations. Also for clarity, personality dimensions will be 
referred to as aspects, to distinguish them from the number of dimensions used in 
individual solutions. The PROFIT analysis also produced vector weights, which indicated 
how the 8 aspects fit into the 2, 3 or 4 dimensional solution.
When deciding on the number of dimensions to allow for individual configurations, 
the criterion was that the solution adequately represent the input data with as few 
dimensions as possible (Kruskal & Wish, 1978). The rate at which stress decreases with 
increasing dimensionality or the dimensionality after which there is little improvement in fit 
was useful in determining optimal dimensionality (Kruskal & Wish, 1978). R2 and stress
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FIGURE 1
Stimulus Configuration for NIC23 as Revealed by an ALSCAL Analysis
in 2 Dimensions
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FIGURE 2
Stimulus Configuration for NIC25 as Revealed by an ALSCAL Analysis
in 2 Dimensions
HQ
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from the ALSCAL analysis and vector weights from the PROFIT analysis were used to 
decide how many dimensions were necessary to describe each person’s data adequately. 
Decisions were made based on the following criteria: R2 of 0.66 or above, with two-thirds 
of the variance explained by the solution; a stress value of at most 0.3, accepting the 
dimensionality just before the decrements in stress become negligible (i.e., 0.01); and good 
clarity of dimensions as determined by a vector weighing heavily on each dimension in the 
solution, with a value of at least 0.6, but preferably 0.8 or 0.9. Clarity is needed to name a 
dimension and naming helps make sense of the person’s organizing aspects. A vector 
weight of 0.6 indicated that the aspect had a reasonable prominence in the subject’s 
conceptualization of the group.
There must have been a compelling reason to increase dimensionality, which 
essentially makes solutions more difficult to interpret. A dramatic improvement in the 
clarity of dimensions, stress or R2, without the increase degrading any other measure was a 
reason to accept higher dimensionality. For example, the decision about dimensionality for
i
SP024 rested primarily on clarity. The question was whether to accept 3 or 4 dimensions. 
There was a 0.5 increase in R2 (from 0.76 to 0.81) and stress decreased from 0.1/7 to 0.13 
with the added fourth dimension, which were substantial changes. But the three 
dimensional solution had 3 well-defined dimensions, whereas in 4 dimensions the high 
vector weights fell on one dimension, leaving 3 poorly-defined. When the vector weights 
were considered, it was clear that the 3 dimensional solution was better overall.
By establishing guidelines for decision-making, dimensionality was different for 
each subject, but R2, stress, and clarity for each subject’s solution were similar. The 
overall mean for all groups was m=0.76 (sd=0.06) for R2 and m=0.17 (sd=0.03) for 
stress. Table 3 shows the dimensionality chosen for each person’s data, as well as p 
values for the mandatory aspects from PROFIT. Vector weights of 0.6 or more were 
prominent in explaining the dimensions for each person’s solution. These values are 
presented in Table 4.
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TABLE 3
Dimensionality Chosen for Individual Solutions and Accompanying Rho (p) Values 
for Mandatory Aspects from PROFIT Analysis
MANDATORY ASPECTS
SU B JE C T S Dim Stress R2
Conventional
1
Friendly
2
Controlling
3.
Ope
4
GROUP 1
SPOIO 3 .14 .8 6 .91 .52 .47 .56
SPO ll 4 .13 .77 .8 6 .48 .72 .56
SP014 3 .16 .80 .6 8 .50 .83 .46
SP016 2 .27 .71 .57 .92 .69 .60
SP017 2 .19 .83 .71 .84 .6 6 .49
SP018 3 .17 .71 .60 .30 .53 .43
SP021 2 .20 .83 .82 .59 .53 .30
SP022 3 .10 .92 .67 .40 .63 .26
SP023 4 .13 .75 .72 .50 .31 .26
SP024 3 .17 .76 .77 .41 .8 6 .45
SP025 4 .14 .70 .81 .62 .51 .58
SP026 3 .17 .79 .43 .57 .55 .41
SP027 3 .17 .69 .77 .48 .6 6 .44
SP028 4 .13 .76 .49 .61 .46 .28
SP029 3 .18 .71 .71 .49 .60 .79
GROUP 2
NIC 10 3 .17 .74 .77 .78 .84 .78
NIC 11 3 .12 .89 .6 6 .8 8 .79 .84
NIC 12 3 .17 .75 .64 .56 .40 .33
NIC 13 3 .17 .73 .58 .75 .78 .75
NIC 14 3 .17 .72 .62 .70 .71 .65
NIC 15 3 .18 .69 .67 .71 .87 .75
NIC 17 4 .14 .6 8 .71 .73 .67 .70
NIC 19 4 .14 .72 .76 .8 6 .70 .80
NIC20 4 .15 .67 .42 .48 .55 .44
NIC21 4 .11 .85 .61 .78 .84 .83
NIC23 2 .19 .81 .31 .85 .41 .8 6
NIC24 3 .17 .74 .70 .89 .54 .84
NIC25 2 .17 .8 6 .81 .81 .57 .72
NIC27 3 .16 .79 .84 .74 .69 .62
NIC28 4 .15 .67 .55 .35 .72 .53
NIC29 4 .12 .76 .52 .78 .47 .61
NIC30 3 .17 .74 .90 .89 .61 .95
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TABLE 3 (continued)
MANDATORY ASPECTS
SU B JE C T S Dim Stress R2
Conventional
1
Friendly
2
Controlling
3
Open
4
GROUP 3
DINIO 4 .15 .71 .55 .59 .63 .54
DIN 11 4 .14 .75 .70 .85 .65 .48
DIN 12 3 .14 .86 .83 .88 .87 .87
DIN 13 3 .17 .77 .71 .78 .74 .78
DIN 15 3 .19 .71 .68 .72 .76 .80
DIN 17 3 .18 .73 .78 .95 .88 .58
DIN21 4 .12 .78 .75 .69 .57 .72
DIN23 2 .21 .78 .43 .33 .48 .53
DIN24 3 .17 .81 .50 .57 .13 .39
DIN25 2 .20 .78 .38 .44 .77 .38
DIN26 2 .20 .80 .69 .60 .61 .40
DIN27 3 .19 .75 .70 .81 .64 .66
DIN28 4 .14 .73 .25 .54 .53 .50
DIN29 3 .18 .71 .61 .50 .35 .55
GROUP 4
YAT10 2 .22 .75 .70 .55 .55 .66
YAT12 4 .16 .76 .73 .89 .83 .77
YAT13 2 .23 .77 .90 .65 .72 .69
YAT15 4 .15 .71 .74 .62 .51 .89 ,
YAT16 3 .18 .74 .45 .27 .58 .57 '
YAT17 2 .21 .76 .86 .86 .35 .73
YAT19 3 .18 .70 .58 .34 .36 .51
YAT20 4 .15 .69 .80 .59 .67 .66
YAT21 2 .20 .87 .79 .93 .87 .85
YAT22 3 .18 .72 .46 .69 .67 .78
YAT23 4 .15 .71 .34 .48 .61 .58
YAT24 3 .16 .78 .72 .73 .66 .58
YAT25 3 .18 .73 .80 .58 .86 .69
YAT28 3 .17 .80 .64 .27 .79 .56
YAT29 3 .15 .81 .67 .58 .79 .78
YAT32 3 .16 .77 .91 .82 .79 .84
YAT33 3 .16 .85 .83 .48 .62 .52
YAT34 3 .16 .78 .56 .75 .76 .76
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TABLE 4
Vector Weights of 0.6 or Above of Voluntary and Mandatory (*) Aspects from PROFIT 
Analysis for Individual Solutions in 2, 3 or 4 Dimensions
D IM EN SIO N S
SU B JE C T  1 2 3 4
SPO10 Genuine .94 
Party .96 
Caring .96 
*Conventional .87 
Manipulative .74 
’‘Controlling .68
SPO ll Introverted .89
Academic .85 
*Friendly .77 
*Controlling .79 
*Open .67
SP014 Morals .95
*Conventional .82 
*Friendly .67 
Friendliness .66 
* Friendly .67
SP016 Compassion .98
HardGet Along .99 
Humor .99 
*Conventional .85 
*Friendly .99 
*Controlling .88 
*Open .99
SP017 Intelligent .99
*Conventional .93 
Humor .71 
Friendliness .78 
Interesting .65 
*Friendly .67
SP018 Compatible .78
*Friendly .77 
*Open .78 
Well Adjusted .61 
*Controlling .67 
Humor .73 
Interesting .72
*Friendly .85 
*Open .7
Manipulative .6
*Conventional .92 HardGet Along .71 
HardGetAlong .61
Personality .92 
Interesting .96 
*Open .98 
*Controlling .76
Friendliness .91
*Controlling .96 
*Open .93 
Humor .71 
Friendliness .62 
Interesting .76 
*Friendly .75
*Conventional .96 
*Controlling .69 
Humor .61
Well Adjusted .77
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SUBJECT
SP021
SP022
SP023
SP024
SP025
SP026
SP027
TABLE 4 (continued)
DIMENSIONS
1 2 3 4
Humor .98 
*Friendly .99 
Unselfish .73 
Responsible .72 
Manipulative .71 
Controlling .62 
*Open .65
Manipulative .95 
Conventional .88 
Controlling .89 
*Open .97 
Anxious .79 
Intelligent .74
LivingHabits .88 
HardGetAlong .81 
Humor .96 
*Controlling .89 
*Friendly .75
Morals .84 
Religious .86
Religious .79 
*Friendly .81 
*Controlling .86 
Introverted .66
Outgoing .72 
Reserved .69 
Controlling .68 
*Controlling .67 
Outgoing .67
Friendly .91 
Introverted .96 
Humor .99 
Interesting .88 
Conventional .97 
*Friendly .96 
Controlling .98 
*Open .96
Conventional .99 
Unselfish .68 
Responsible .69 
Manipulative .7 
Controlling .78 
*Open .76
Interesting .83
Reserved .7 
Conventional .78 
*Open .8 
*Friendly .64
*Conventional .7 
Academic .61
Humor .81 
Conventional .84 
*Open .79
Disposition .99 
Activities .83 
*Open .82
*Friendly .87
*Friendly .83 
Manipulative .83
*Conventional .96 
*Friendly .81
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SU B JE C T
SP028
SP029
NIC 10
NIC 11
NIC 12
NIC 13
TABLE 4 (continued)
DIMENSIONS
1 2 3 4
*Open .7 
Attractive .92
* Friendly .81
* Controlling .8
Controlling .99 
Morals .89 
Conventional .63 
Living Habits .72 
HardGetAlong .72
Intelligent .99 
Academic .98 
*Friendly .97 
*Open .99 
*Conventional .87 
Controlling .77 
Interesting .69 
Attitude .83
*Controlling .74 
Attractive .81 
*Friendly .81 
Reserved .8 
*Conventional .81 
Controlling .66
Reserved .93 
Anxious .94 
HardGetAlong .62 
Conventional .64 
HardGetAlong .76
Interesting .99 
Friendly .92 
Well Ad justed .95 
*Friendly .93 
*Open .94 
Conventional .61 
Controlling .78
Academic .89 
*Open .64
HardGetAlong .65 
*Open .64 
Conventional .68 
Living Habits .68
Interesting .73 
Controlling .63
Introverted .81 Assertive .8 
*Convention.76
Personality .93 
*Friendly .79
Interesting .88 Superficiality .82
Conventional .86 
*Open ,85
Academic .67 *Friendly .99
Conventional .77 Controlling .94 
*Open .96
Values .72 Conventional .68
Controlling .62
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SU B JE C T  
NIC 14
NIC 15 
NIC 17 
NIC 19
NIC20
NIC21
NIC23
TABLE 4 (continued)
DIMENSIONS
1 2 3 4
Friendly .61 
Religious .61 
♦Conventional .62 
♦Controlling .67 
♦Conventional .77 
♦Controlling .73 
Friendliness .8 
Religious .76
Outgoing .92 
Personality .93 
Compatible .88 
♦Controlling .97 
♦Friendly .84 
♦Open .7
Physical aspects .77 
♦Friendly .66 
♦Controlling .68 
♦Open .74 
♦Controlling .71 
♦Open .66
Athletic .64 
Personality .61 
Humor .71 
♦Conventional .82 
♦Friendly .61 
♦Controlling .68
Fun .76 
Interesting .83 
Attractive .76 
♦Controlling .64 
♦Open .66
Friendliness .68 
Academic .78 
♦Conventional .85
Personality .98 
Reserved .86 
HardGetAlong .97 
Academic .87 
♦Friendly .97 
♦Open .98 
♦Conventional .76
Academic .97 
Humor .88 
♦Friendly .89 
♦Open .95
♦Open .71 
♦Conventional .77
♦Conventional .87 
Personality .83 
Humor .73 
♦Friendly .61
Athletic .76 
Personality .76
♦Friendly .71 
♦Open .7 
Fun .62 
Attractive .62 
♦Controlling .72
Introverted .67 
♦Friendly .72 
♦Controlling .81
♦Conventional .65 
♦Controlling .93
Academic .70
Kind/Cooperative .78
♦Friendly .62 
♦Open .62
Academic .78
Superficiality .92 
♦Conventional .94
Well Adjusted .69
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SU B JE C T
NIC24
NIC25
NIC 2 7
NIC28
NIC 2 9
NIC 30
DIN 10
DIN 11
TABLE 4 (continued)
DIMENSIONS
1 2 3 4
PositiveAttitude .96 
Attractive .95 
*Friendly .89 
*Open .86 
HowTreatOthers .84
Intelligent .97 
HardGetAlong .9 
Humor .79 
Conventional .93 
*Friendly .86 
*Open .95
Friendly .85 
Cooperative .87 
*Conventional .97 
*Open .78 
Reserved .71
HardGetAlong .88 
Academic .83 
*Conventional .64 
Controlling .69
*Conventional .82 
HardGet Along .75 
*Open .69 
*Open .6
Values .99 
Conventional .83 
*Friendly .97 
*Open .98
Conventional .69 
*Friendly .83 
Interesting .9 
Conventional .62 
Controlling .83
Personality .91 
Intelligent .95 
HardGetAlong .96 
Considerate .86 
Conventional .62 
*Friendly .86 
*Open .86
*Controlling .94 
Conventional .74
PersonalHabits .83 
Controlling .92 
Humor .62
Introverted .87 
*Friendly .95 
Controlling .89
Understanding .95 
*Open .77 
Controlling .67
Friendly .7 
*Friendly .89 
Controlling .99
Interests .71 
Athletic .74 
Well Adjusted .74
Athletic .81* 
Attractive .86
AttitudeStudying .81
*Open .61
Humor .64 
*Friendly .64
Interesting .71 
Tolerant .61
Athletic .61 
Controlling .60
Interesting .6
HardGetAlong .74 Open .76
Controlling .64 Conventional .69
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SU B JE C T
DIN12
DIN 13
DIN 15
DIN 17
DIN21
DIN23
DIN24
TABLE 4 (continued) 
DIMENSIONS
Outgoing .84 
Academic .77 
Conventional .76 
Controlling .83
Humor .99 
Introverted .87 
Interesting .94 
Controlling .91 
*Open .93 
*Friendly .8
HardGetAlong .68 
Conventional .73 
Controlling .67 
Controlling .7 
*Open .61
Humor .99 
Academic .73 
*FriendIy .95 
Controlling .97 
*Open .83 
Argumentative .63
Interesting .62 
Conventional .68 
Individuality .8 
*Friendly .77 
Controlling .86 
*Open .82
Honest .82 
Friendly .99 
Manipulative .68 
*Friendly .9 
Controlling .96 
*Open .69
DrinkingBeliefs .84 
*Open .97 
Conventional .93 
* Friendly .62
HardGetAlong .88 
*Friendly .89 
*Open .88 
*Conventional .62
Intelligent .76
HardGetAlong .75 Conventional .89
LikeThem .86 
* Friendly .79 
Conventional .61
Truthful .71 
Academic .67 
Conventional .97
Well Adjusted .84 
Interesting .64
Interesting .96 
Manipulative .74 
Conventional .85 
*Open .72
Personality .97 
HardGetAlong .96 
Controlling .76
TheirBehavior.7 
HardGetAlong .7 
(No Label) .75
Truthful .63 
Argumentative .77
Manipulative .86
Intelligent .89 
*Friendly .72
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SU B JE C T
DIN25
DIN26
DIN27
DIN28
DIN29
YAT10
YAT12
TABLE 4 (continued) 
D IM EN SIO N S
Manipulative .96 
Lawful .99 
Controlling .99 
Loudness .94 
Argumentative .73 
*Open .67
Humor .79 
Conventional .92 
Controlling .99 
*Open .98 
Academic .61
Personality .99 
Athletic.9 
Intelligent .83 
*Friendly .91 
Controlling .98 
*Open .78
Humor .61 
Controlling .6 
* Friendly .86 
*Open .93
Humor .66 
HardGetAlong .83 
Controlling .9 
Cooperation .68 
Conventional .77
Controlling .85 
RespectOthers .99 
Humor .93 
HardGet Along .94 
Conventional .99 
*Friendly .85 
*Open .94
Introverted .88 
Conventional .89 
*Friendly .8 
Controlling .72 
*Open .85
Argumentative .69 
Conventional .97 
* Friendly .99 
*Open .75
Amicability .99 
Manipulative .81 
Academic .79 
*Friendly .73 
Humor .61
Manipulative .94 
Conventional .99
Intelligent .71* 
Academic .69
RespectOthers .86 
*Open .94 
Humor .7 
Cooperation .72
Friendliness .99
Friendliness .79 
HelpOthers .64 
HardGetAlong .66
Intelligent .64 
Interesting .73
*Friendly .9
*Convention.81
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SU B JE C T
YAT13
YAT15
YAT16
YAT17
YAT19
YAT20
YAT21
TABLE 4 (continued)
DIMENSIONS
1 2 3 4
Humor .9 
HardGetAlong .96 
*Friendly .99 
*Open .92
EasyGoing .75 
Interesting .61 
*Open .69
*Open .7
HardGetAlong .93 
*Friendly .84 
Conventional .91
Academic .98 
Introverted .88 
Conventional .85 
Controlling .82
*Friendly .64 
Controlling .74 
*Open .62
Well Adjusted .99 
Controlling .85
Humor .69 
Interesting .7
Humor .85
* Conventional .93 
Controlling .62
Friendliness .84 
Academic .99 
Trustworthy .85 
Interesting .97 
Conventional .89 
* Friendly .95 
*Open .99
Interesting .87 
Reserved .98 
Humor .62 
Conventional .77 
*Friendly .6
Athletic .65 
Humor .72 
*Friendly .79 
*Open .79
Interesting .94 
Athletic .87 
Humor .93 
Introverted .91 
*Conventional .99 
*Friendly .86 
*Controlling .9 
*Open .81
^Controlling .96
Controlling .87 
*Open .93 
Humor .7 
*Friendly .61
Intelligent .97 
Conventional .87 
Controlling .65
Athletic .88 
Conventional .63
Interesting .62
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SU B JE C T
YAT22
YAT23
YAT24
YAT25
YAT28
YAT29
YAT32
YAT33
YAT34
TABLE 4 (continued)
DIMENSIONS
1 2 3 4
HardGetAlong .76
* Friendly .62 
Humor .84
* Friendly.7 6 
Controlling. 89
* Open. 85
Academic .83 
Athletic .71 
Intelligent .72 
Conventional .71 
Controlling .71
Introverted .94 
Materialistic .81
* Friendly .88 
*Open .87 
Controlling .78
Athletic .94
* Friendly .88 
*Controlling .85 
*Open .82 
Introverted .78
Humor .99 
Controlling .98 
*Open .8
HardGetAlong .69 
WellAdjusted .76
Athletic .91 
Controlling .9
Introverted .91 
Athletic .87 
*Friendly .62 
*Controlling .71 
*Open .62 
Social Activity .75
Introverted .92 
Controlling .88 
*Open .73 
StudyHabits .62 
Academic .66
Introverted .99 
Controlling .94
Introverted .70 
Humor .99
Conventional .84
Attractive .88 
*Open .74
Religious .92 
Conventional .89 
WellAdjusted .71
Academic .81 
Conventional .82 
Intelligent .66
HardGetAlong .63 
*Friendly .77 
Genuine .68
Sincerity .97 
Conventional .88
Type of Student .92 
Conventional .98 
Social Activity .63 
*Friendly .74 
Controlling .7 
*Open .78
Conventional .91 
*Friendly .62 
StudyHabits .68
*Friendly .81 
Intelligent .67
Materialistic .53 
Controlling .51
Intelligent .76
Athletic .61
Conventional .83
Introverted .79 
*Friendly .60
Anxious .78 
*Friendly .78
HardGetAlong .97 Conventional .60 
*Friendly .99 *Open .79
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Results of ALSCAL and MOTION analyses suggested that no two people were 
alike in how they conceptualized members of the same group. People did not have the 
same stimulus configurations, which does not support a nomothetic analysis. This leaves 
open the possibility that each person has a unique cognitive framework, which is not 
similar to any other framework. Using information from PROFIT to compare solutions, it 
was predicted that subjects’ frameworks were similar in some ways. It may be that 
individuals use the same cognitive dimensionsl but place the stimuli differently along these 
dimensions. This would support the idiographic perspective.
The groups were compared to see how they were similar and how they were 
distinctive. This was done because each group may have been so individualized that it 
represented an entirely different arrangement than another group. Evidence for this 
distinction would suggest that there was a group response style, which made people within 
a group more similar than would occur by chance. If this were false, then it would not 
matter what group a subject was in, because their data would be unrelated to every other 
group members’ data. Thus, there would be as many groups as subjects. Subjects could 
be collapsed across group for analyses on mandatory dimensions, selected dimensions, and 
other traits of importance.
A Chi-square analysis was done to see if the frequency of dimensions chosen for 
individual solutions differed by group. The data used for this analysis appears in Table 5. 
For all four groups, 3 dimensional solutions were chosen the most, with a handful of 2 and 
4 dimensional solutions. The analysis revealed no significant difference by group in the 
frequency with which 2, 3, and 4 dimensions were chosen (Pearson X2 (6)=1.22, 
p>0.05). This means that groups did not differ in the complexity of their data.
Rho values for mandatory dimensions and the intercorrelations among the p values 
were converted to z scores, which are presented as group means in Tables 6 and 7. There 
were noticeable differences among groups, suggesting that there may have been group 
response styles. The importance of each mandatory aspect varied systematically by group.
TABLE 5
Group Frequencies of Dimensions Chosen for Individual Solutions
NUMBER OF DIM ENSIONS
2 3 4
G RO U P
1 3 8 4
2 2 9 6
3 3 7 4
4 4 10 4
Mean 3.00 8.50 4.50
SD .71 1.12 .87
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TABLE 6
Group Means and Ranges of Raw and Transformed Rho (p) Values and Percentages of 
Rho Values 0.6 and Above for Mandatory Aspects from PROFIT Analysis in 2, 3 or 4
Dimensions
MANDATORY ASPECTS
Conventional Friendly Controlling Open
1 2  3 4
GRO UP 1
Raw Means 
Raw Ranges 
% greater than .6
.70
.43 to .91 
80
.55
.30 to .92 
26.7
.60
.31 to .86 
53.3
.46 
.26 to 
13.3
.79
Transformed Means 
Transformed Ranges
.92
.46 to 1.53
.67
.31 to 1.62
.73
.32 to 1.31
.51 
.26 to 1.06
GROUP 2
Raw Means 
Raw Ranges 
% greater than .6
.65
.31 to .9 
70.6
.74 
.35 to .89 
82.4
.66
.4 to .87 
64.7
.71 
.33 to 
82.4
.95
Transformed Means 
Transformed Ranges
.82
.33 to 1.5
1.01
.37 to 1.43
.83
.43 to 1.33
.95 
.34 to 1.79
GROUP 3
Raw Means 
Raw Ranges 
% greater than .6
.61
.25 to .83 
64.3
.66
.322 to .95 
57.1
.61
.13 to .87 
64.3
.58 
.37 to 
35.7
.86
Transformed Means 
Transformed Ranges
.75
.25 to 1.2
88
.34 to 1.84
.78
.14 to 1.35
.71
.39 to 1.31
GROUP 4
Raw Means 
Raw Ranges 
% greater than .6
.69
.34 to .91 
72.2
.61
.26 to .93 
50
.67
.35 to .87 
72.2
.69 
.5 to .! 
66.7
89
Transformed Means .92 
Transformed Ranges .36 to 1.5
8 85
*27 to 1.69 .37 to 1.35
88
.56 to 1.43
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TABLE 7
Group Means and Ranges of Raw and Transformed Rho (p) Values of Intercorrelations 
for Mandatory Aspects from PROFIT Analysis in 2, 3, or 4 Dimensions
PAIRED MANDATORY ASPECTS
1-2 1-3 1-4 2-3 2-4 3-4
GRO UP 1
Raw Means and Ranges
.46 .01 .15 .76 .89 .87
(-.78 to .99) (-.98 to .92) (-.89 to .87) (-.83 to .99) (-.26 to .99) (-.01 to .99)
Transformed Means and Ranges
.49 .01 .15 .99 1.42 1.31
(-1.04 to 2.83) (-1.44to 1.58) (-1.43 to 1.35) (-1.18 to 2.51) (-.27 to 3.8) (-.01 to 3.25)
GROUP 2
Raw Means and Ranges
.13 -.08 .16 .84 .95 .84
(-.95 to .97) (-.96 to .96) (-.94 to .97) (-.21 to .98) (.53 to .99) (.43 to .99)
Transformed Means and Ranges
.13 -.08 .16 1.22 1.81 1.23
(-1.83 to 2.06) (-1.97 to 1.95) (-1.71 to 2.13) (-.21 to 2.23) (.59 to 3.11) (.45 to 3.11)
GROUP 3 '
Raw Means and Ranges
.47 .14 .14 .34 .84 .60
(-.78to.97) (-.88 10.99) (-.97 to .94) (-.99 to .99) (.12 to .99) (-.87 to .96)
Transformed Means and Ranges
.5 .14 .14 .35 1.23 .69
(-1.05 to 2.03) (-1.46 to 2.83) (-2.17 to 1.75) (-2.83 to 3.11) (.12 to 3.11) (-1.34 to 1.97)
GROUP 4
Raw Means and Ranges
.75 .18 .63 .62 .81 .84
(-.28 to .99) (-.82 to .83) (-.59 to .98) (-.49 to .99) (-.83 to .99) (.06 to .99)
Transformed Means and Ranges
.96 .18 .55 .72 1.12 1.22
(-.29 to 2.99) (-1.14 to 1.19) (-.68 to 2.41) (-.53 to 3.25) (-1.2 to 3.45) (.06 to 2.99)
49
The intercorrelations revealed the relationships among the mandatory aspects and it seemed 
that groups perceived the aspects differently. Several repeated-measures MANOVA by 
group were computed on the transformed p values and transformed intercorrelations among 
p values. The analyses tested whether the four groups differed significantly on the 
importance of and relationships among the mandatory dimensions.
Further differences among groups were found. A MANOVA analysis revealed a 
significant difference among the four groups on the importance of the mandatory aspects (F 
(9,180)=3.34, pc.Ol). When the female groups were analyzed using independent t-tests, 
the second and fourth aspects were both significantly different (t (30)=3.03, pc.Ol and t 
(30)=4.25, pc.Ol, respectively). There were no significant differences between the male 
groups on the importance of mandatory aspects, using independent t-tests. When subjects 
were grouped by male and female, the importance of the mandatory aspects were not 
significantly different. Thus, the significant difference for the mandatory aspects could not 
be explained by sex; one female group used the second and fourth aspects more than the 
other three groups.
A MANOVA analysis revealed a significant difference among the four grqups on
r
the intercorrelations among the mandatory aspects (F (15, 300)= 1.97, pc.05). When 
subjects were grouped by male and female, the intercorrelations were significantly different 
(F (5,310)=4.29, pc.Ol). When t-tests were done on the two female groups, there were 
no significant differences among intercorrelations. The same was true for the two male 
groups. The significant difference for intercorrelations was therefore explained by sex. In 
the relationships established among the mandatory aspects, the female halls were similar 
and the male halls were similar, but males and females were different from each other. 
These group analyses revealed that the mandatory dimensions were differentially important 
to groups. Individuals interpreted the dimensions differently and the dimensions varied in 
their utility to individuals’ solutions. Thus, subjects could not be collapsed across groups 
at all.
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It was predicted that the four mandatory aspects would play an important role in 
explaining individuals’ solutions. Mean p values were m=0.66 (sd=0.15) for 
conventionality, m=0.64 (sd=0.18) for friendliness, m=0.64 (sd=0.16) for being 
controlling, and m=0.62 (sd=0.17) for intimacy, p values were considered important in 
explaining the data with a value of 0.6 or above. The mean percentages of p values greater 
than 0.6 were 71.8% (sd=6.55) for conventionality, 54.0% (sd=22.6) for friendliness, 
63.5% (sd=7.85) for being controlling, and 49.5% (sd=31.0) for intimacy. These values 
suggest that all four aspects were important in explaining solutions. Between 50 to 70% of 
people used the mandatory aspects to organize people in their group. Individual groups 
and individual solutions should be considered to determine the salience of any one aspect, 
because of the amount of variation reflected in the mean.
Also worthy of note are the extent of the intercorrelations of the four mandatory 
aspects. For all four groups, friendliness and intimacy allowed were correlated (r=0.87, 
n=64) and controlling and allowing intimacy were correlated (r=0.79, n=64). For some of 
the groups, conventionality and friendliness (r=0.56, n=48), conventionality and intimacy 
allowed (i-0.63, n=18), and friendly and controlling (r=0.74, n=50) were correlated. 
Again, these correlations varied by group and each combination of interrelationships are 
best understood by attention to individual groups and even individual solutions.
The aspects chosen by each subject to explain judgments of similarity were highly 
variable. The importance of these aspects varied greatly, as well. Voluntary aspects and 
Rho values for each subject are presented in Table 8. Individual solutions were not 
analyzed to determine the salience of voluntary aspects to the MDS space, because of 
variability. Some general observations were made about the voluntary aspects. First of all, 
the 3 aspects subjects generated to explain their similarity judgments were not always 
chosen once the list of 17 U'aits were presented. Subjects probably used global 
characteristics for their judgments, but when asked what these characteristics were, they 
broke them up into pieces. For example, “attractiveness” may have been a salient
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TABLE 8
Voluntary Aspects and Rho Values from PROFIT for Individual Solutions
in 2, 3 or 4 Dimensions
SUBJECTS
VOLUNTARY ASPECTS
GROUP 1
SPOIO
SPO ll
SP014
SP016
SP017
SP018
SP021
SP022
SP023
SP024
SP025
SP026
SP027
SP028
SP029
.91 .88
*Genuineness *Amount of Partying
.53 .77
*Personalities Introverted
.55 .84
^Personality *Morals
.65 .89
♦Compassion Hard to Get Along With
.73 .79
Good Sense of Humor Intelligent
.23 .30
♦Compatibility Good Sense of Humor
.67
Good Sense of Humor
.55
.85 .88
♦Caring for Others Manipulative
.62 .65
Academically Oriented Hard to Get Along With
.51 .44
Interesting * Friendliness
.90 .43
Good Sense of Humor ♦Friendliness
Manipulative
.73
♦Living Habits
.59
*How Outgoing
.50
Good Sense of Humor
.72
♦Outgoingness
.48
♦Friendliness
.31
Academically Oriented
.29
.58
♦Unselfishness " 
.62 
Anxious
.83
Hard to Get Along With
.78
Academically Oriented 
.61 
Manipulative
.65
♦Disposition
.29
Introverted
.31
♦Assertiveness
.59
.79
* Friendliness
.30
Interesting
.83
Responsible 
.00 
Interesting
.57
Reserved
.79
♦Morals and Values
.48
Religious
.50
♦Activities
.58
Good Sense of Humor
.52
Physically Attractive
.70
.77
Interesting
.35
Well Adjusted
.51
Manipulative
.41
Intelligent
.65 '
Good Sense of Humor
.64
Religious
.73
Introverted
.35
Reserved
.51
Interesting
.14
In tro verted
.58
"Personality Hard to Get Along With *Morals ''Living Habits
* Aspect that Subject Generated and Chose for Rating
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TABLE 8 (continued)
VOLUNTARY ASPECTS
SU B JE C T S 1 2 3 4
GROUP 2
NIC 10 .73 .82 .69 .75
Interesting ♦Attitude Intelligent Academically Oriented
NIC 11 .34
00 .81 .59
♦Superficiality Reserved Interesting Physically Attractive
NIC 12 .68 .48 .73 .39
Hard to Get Along With Academically Oriented Reserved Anxious
NIC13 .65 .70 .77 .81
♦Values Interesting ♦Friendliness Well Adjusted
NIC 14 .71 .59 .62 .49
♦Friendliness Academically Oriented Good Sense of Humor Religious
NIC 15 .84 .85
O')
00 .73
♦Outgoingness ♦Personality ♦Compatibility Academically Oriented
NIC 17 .73 .74
oo .69
♦Personality ♦Kindness/Cooperation ♦Physical Aspects Good Sense of Humor
NIC 19 .55 .87 .66 .83
Athletic ♦Personality Academically Oriented Good Sense of Humor
NIC20 .63 .62 .59 .75
♦Superficiality ♦Fun Interesting Physically Attractive
NIC21 .81 .82 .75 .75
♦Friendliness Well Adjusted Academically Oriented Introverted
NIC23 .79 .61 .82 .93
♦Personality Reserved Hard to Get Along With Academically Oriented
NIC24 .88 .91 .79 .88
♦Positive Attitude Towards Life ♦How They Treat Others ♦Attitude Towards Studying Physically Attractive
NIC25 .60 .90 .82 .62
♦Personal Habits Hard to Get Along With *Sense of Humor Intelligent
NIC27 .82 .86 .80 .68
♦Friendliness ♦Cooperation Introverted Reserved
N1C28 .41 .57 .52 .67
♦Understanding Hard to Get Along With Academically Oriented Good Sense of Humor
NIC29 .80 .72 .51 .28
♦Friendly Interesting ♦Tolerant Hard to Get Along With
NIC30 .92 .34 .53 .68
♦Values ♦Interests Athletic Well Adjusted
* Aspect that Subject Generated and Chose for Rating
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TABLE 8 (continued)
VOLUNTARY ASPECTS
SU B JE C T S 1 2 3 4
GROUP 3
DIN 10 .47 .64 .63 .53
Athletic Hard to Get Along With Physically Attractive Interesting
DIN11 .80 .85 .87
00
♦Personality Intelligent Hard to Get Along With ♦Consideration of Others
DIN 12 . 8 6 .77 .8 6 .71
*Outgoing Intelligent Hard to Get Along With Academically Oriented
DIN 13 .84 .55 .82 .85
Good Sense of Humor Introverted Interesting Hard to Get Along with
DIN 15 .50 .80 .77 .00
♦If I Like Them ♦Their Behavior Hard to Get Along With (No Label)
DIN 17 .71 .6 6 .51 .94
♦Truthfulness Academically Oriented Argumentative Good Sense of Humor
DIN21 .77
oo .83 .8 8
Well Adjusted Interesting ♦Individuality Manipulative
DIN23 00 .24 .37 .71
* Honest Interesting ♦Friendliness Manipulative
DIN24 .91 .89 .91
oo
*Personaiity/Dispositiorii ♦Drinking Beliefs Hard to Get Along With Intelligent
DIN25 .69 .64 .93 .60 ;
♦Loudness Manipulative ♦Lawfulness Argumentative
DIN26 .84 .80 .82 .6 8
♦Amicability Good Sense of Humor Manipulative Academically Oriented
DIN27 .90 .77 .43 .00
*Personalities Athletic Intelligent Manipulative
DIN28 .54 .62 .54 .83
Good Sense of Humor Intelligent Interesting Academically Oriented
DIN29 .60 .63 .67 .48
*Respect for Others ♦Cooperation Hard to Get Along With Good Sense of Humor
* Aspect that Subject Generated and Chose for Rating
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TABLE 8 (continued)
VOLUNTARY ASPECTS
SU B JE C T S 1 2 3 4
GRO UP 4
YAT10 .30 .86 .65 .80
* Friendliness *Respect for Others Good Sense of Humor Hard to Get Along With
YAT12 .57 .51 .52 .75
*Friendliness Introverted Hard to Get Along With *Willingness to Help Others
YAT13 .73 .79 .73 .73
Academically Oriented Introverted Good Sense of Humor Hard to Get Along With
YAT15 .74 .91 .94 .90
*Easy Going and Likes *Easy to Talk to Good Sense of Humor Interesting
to Have a Good Time and Likes to Listen
YAT16 .37 .33 .42 .54
(No Label) Good Sense of Humor Well Adjusted Hard to Get Along With
YAT17 .85 .80 .88 .87
*Friendliness Academically Oriented *Trustworthiness Interesting
YAT19 .43 .49 .18 .63
Good Sense of Humor Athletic Interesting Reserved
YAT20 .69 .60 .80 .66
Interesting *Humor Athletic Intelligent
YAT21 .96 .35 .92 .89
Interesting Athletic Good Sense of Humor Introverted ^
YAT22 .60 .76 .74 .75
Introverted Hard to Get Along With Good Sense of Humor Good Sense of Humor
YAT23 .84 .70 .84 .60
Academically Oriented Physically Attractive Athletic Intelligent
YAT24 .86 .88 .80 .81
Introverted *Materialism Religious Well Adjusted
YAT25 .73 .87 .80 .53
Academically Oriented Introverted Athletic Intelligent
YAT28 .31 .47 .90 .68
Hard to Get Along With ^Genuine Well Adjusted Good Sense of Humor
YAT29 .20 .52 .87 .80
*Sincerity Good Sense of Humor Athletic Introverted
YAT32 .49 .87 .76 .89
Introverted Athletic *Type of Student *Involvement in Social Activity 
What Kind As Well
YAT33 .61 .58 .74 .55
*Study Habits Academically Oriented Anxious Introverted
YAT34 .82 .88 .62 .71
Introverted Hard to Get Along With Reserved Athletic
* Aspect that Subject Generated and Chose for Rating
characteristic in the subject’s judgment of similarity, but the characteristic they generated 
was “knows how to dress.” For the most part, the aspects people chose from the list were 
useful in explaining their data. Sometimes the aspects had very low p values which 
suggests that some subjects did not know what aspects they based their similarity 
judgments on. There were some commonly chosen aspects, which were important (high p 
values) in explaining individuals’ solutions in all four groups. These aspects were athletic, 
religious, academic/intelligent and positive interpersonal attributes (friendly, interesting, 
cooperative, good sense of humor) or negative interpersonal attributes (superficial, 
anxious, and hard to get along with). These important voluntary aspects could be 
described generally as common interests and interpersonal appeal.
DISCUSSION
Previous research has established that schemata and implicit personality theories 
vary by perceiver correlates and perceptual judgments are influenced by internal and 
external variables. Researchers have assumed that people’s cognitive representations are 
similar, but similarities have not been adequately tested. Jones and Young (1972) studied 
individual perceptions and found that people had similar cognitive representations of the 
group, but their study involved a group that had a formal structure. Their findings do not 
tell us whether people in unstructured groups organize others in the same way. The current 
project sought to establish and test the differences among individuals’ person schemata or 
implicit personality theories. Multidimensional scaling techniques were used because they 
allow an indepth study of individual perception.
Several important differences set this project apart from the bulk of person 
perception research. Several groups were studied to avoid idiosyncratic results. They 
were drawn from the natural environment to avoid the arbitrary grouping of peoplp in a 
laboratory. They were intact, naturally occurring social groups that were formed randomly 
and had no formal status differences among group members. There was no structure or 
definition apart from that which group members created. Subjects were asked to use their 
own definition of similarity for making similarity judgments. These judgments were then 
based on an already accepted definition of similarity, instead of one generated by the 
experimenter which would require their interpretation and use of an externally defined term. 
Free-response was encouraged, by soliciting the aspects people used in judging similarity. 
In addition to these changes, this study tested the importance of organizing traits found in 
other studies.
The results of this study show that people are not the same in their cognitive
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organizations of other people. The poor fit and small amount of variance explained in the 
group solutions suggested that there was no general cognitive structure underlying the 
groups’ conceptualizations. Trying to create subgroups of the individual solutions did not 
succeed because no pair of people shared the same conceptual framework. When data are 
sufficiently complex, as was found in this study, it requires more idiographic analyses and 
explanations. Individual solutions were the best way of describing the data. This should 
not be interpreted as evidence that there is no structure behind person perception, but that 
no global representation could be found to explain it.
There were similarities among groups and individuals. The questionnaire data 
revealed similarities among people based on participation in Greek life, dating habits, and 
satisfaction with relationships. The multidimensional scaling and rating analyses revealed 
similar R2 and stress values across groups, similar p values for the mandatory aspects, and 
similar voluntary aspects chosen by subjects. No group required more dimensions than 
another group to explain their data. Some people’s data were very clear-cut and simple, 
requiring only two dimensional solutions, while other people’s data were more complicated 
and required four dimensions. For most people, three dimensions were adequate %o explain 
their data. These findings suggest that groups as well as individuals were similar, but not 
the same.
Mandatory aspects were important to each group in different ways and were 
interrelated differently by group. These differences among groups could not be explained 
by obvious variables, like sex. There may have been an implicit group definition, which 
affected people’s cognitive organization. Certain aspects may have been salient to group 
members in organizing the particular members of their group. The mandatory aspects 
(conventional, friendly, conttolling, and open) were quite important to most solutions in 
explaining similarity relationships. The overall importance of the mandatory aspects in 
explaining MDS solutions validated the previous studies where these aspects were set forth 
(Forgas, 1976; Falbo, 1977; Battistich &Thompson, 1980; Hirshberg & Jennings). The
58
importance of the mandatory aspects suggests that people have similar underlying 
organizational principles, even though they manipulate them differently. There were many 
intercorrelations of the mandatory aspects for all four groups. This suggests that the 
mandatory aspects were not mutually exclusive. It is possible that different words or 
phrases would better describe the organizing characteristics better.
Other organizing traits which subjects chose fell into two categories: various 
interests and interpersonal attributes. Previous research suggested that these were 
important (Magnusson, 1971; Jones & Young, 1972; Forgas, 1976; Battistich & 
Thompson, 1980), but the multitude of traits could not be systematically validated in this 
study. The importance of these subject-generated aspects in explaining individual solutions 
suggest that people can assess the aspects underlying their perceptual judgments. These 
voluntary aspects were also important in defining the dimensions of individual solutions. 
Free-response should be encouraged in future studies, to ensure that subjects’ 
interpretations are considered in the results.
The search for subgroups was unsuccessful, not because everyone used different 
aspects for judging similarity, but because they used the same aspects differently./ Null & 
Bloch (1988) found individual solutions to best describe their data in a study of pilots’ 
perceptions of work load. They found that individual solutions could be explained by 
similar dimensions, but the pilots used the dimensions differently. Even when individuals 
used the same dimensions, the dimensions had different relative weights for the different 
individuals. This is a profound discovery of an underlying similarity among individual 
solutions. If group solutions had been forced or subgroups formed even with high error 
terms, this may not have been evident. Thus, the idiographic approach was complicated, 
but ultimately revealed certain nomothetic properties in the individual solutions.
These results have implications for person perception, friendship formation and 
group organization. The importance of the mandatory aspects in people’s organization of 
group members leads to the consideration that these aspects might be important when
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perceiving others for the first time. People may use the mandatory aspects in perceiving 
others, not just in organization. People seem to organize their friends, as well as people 
they are not friends with, along these same dimensions. The presence of a group response 
style could mean that membership in a group influences cognitive organization in subtle 
ways.
The results of this study suggest that research on person perception should take a 
new tact. The philosophy used by biology is more applicable to the study of human 
behavior, than methods used in physics, as the following quote by Stephen Jay Gould 
(1980) so apdy expresses. “At the basis of all this ferment lies nature’s irreducible 
complexity. Organisms are not billiard balls, propelled by simple and measurable external 
forces to predictable new positions on life’s pool table. Sufficiently complex systems have 
greater richness. Organisms have a history that constrains their future in myriad, subtle 
ways.” Biological research is not as simplistic as physics research, because biology 
involves evolution and relinquishes experimental control to gain knowledge from 
observation. Experimental manipulation is used, but the effects of many environmental and 
inuinsic variables are considered in the outcome of the experiment. /
r
Most psychological research focuses on the operationalism and methods of physics. 
Gestalt theory offers an alternative; “the directionality of man’s behavior is described at a 
higher level of abstraction than in other current theories, and some provision is made for 
the way the man himself structures his field” (Kelly, 1963, p.38). A combination of social 
constructivist and idiographic principles could improve the quality of psychological 
research.
According to social constructivists, the discovery of interesting information about 
people is available by studying them in their context and accepting individual complexity. 
Many important thinkers have provided support for this position. Wittgenstein (1953) 
insisted upon the primacy of the public world in matters of psychology, the most important 
information about people being what happens among them. In addition, Garfinkel (1967)
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proposed ethnomethodology, the study of ordinary people’s methods for producing and 
making sense of everyday life. He viewed the goals and aims of ordinary people as similar 
to the goals and aims of the social researcher.
In keeping with this, Harre and Secord (1972) encouraged new ways of thinking 
about people and.new methods of studying their behavior. They focused on two recent 
shifts in perspective: the naturalistic conception of a human being as a rule-following agent; 
and the main features of a realist, non-positivist conception of science. The authors claim 
that people are conscious social actors, capable of controlling their performances and 
commenting intelligently upon them. They assert that social information is more accessible 
to researchers and this approach is more scientific than the traditional conception of the 
human as automaton. Thus, people can be enlisted to help researchers understand social 
behavior.
Kelly (1963) had similar beliefs about people’s ability to study their environment. 
“Might not the individual man, each in his own personal way, assume more of the stature 
of a scientist, ever seeking to predict and control the course of events with which he is 
involved? Would he not have his theories, test his hypotheses, and weigh his experimental 
evidence? And, if so, might not the differences between the personal viewpoints of 
different men correspond to the differences between the theoretical points of view of 
different scientists?” (Kelly, 1963, p. 5). Man has the creative capacity to represent the 
environment, not merely respond to it. He has a constructive psychological nature. He 
creates templates or constructs, which are representations of the world, and then tests them 
against the reality of the world’s events in terms of their predictive utility. These 
constructed systems are real and should be studied using methods which allow people to 
reveal their own theories.
Quite a few psychologists have admitted the importance of an idiographic approach 
to studying people’s perceptions and cognitive organization (Allport, 1937; Kelly, 1963; 
Rosenberg & Sedlak, 1972; Gergen, 1977; Markus & Zajonc, 1985; Jaccard & Dittus,
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1990). Allpoil <1937) first advocated broadening the approaches of psychology to include 
idiography. Taken in an extreme sense, nomothetic and idiographic approaches could be 
the study of mankind versus the study of a single man. Tempered by Kelly (1963), 
Allport’s suggestion could be applied to each study as a collection of individuals’ 
constructs. After the psychologist has conceptualized each case individually, he can further 
abstract the individual constructs to reveal constructs which underlie people in general.
Kelly (1963) assessed individual constructs for use in clinical practice. He found 
that people define the same idea differently. Kelly determined whether a discrepancy 
between two people’s ideas existed by finding out what the organizing poles of the 
construct were for each perceiver. If two people described a person as kind, one of those 
people might mean kind as the opposite of cruel, while the other might mean kind as the 
opposite of hostile. Sometimes people have difficulty assessing their constructs and 
articulating how they are organized. Our language entails certain linguistic conventions 
about opposing traits, which makes it difficult for the person to accurately assess their 
constructs. It might take considerable insight to realize a person views angry as the 
opposite of happy, instead of the more traditional construct happy-sad. >
Other studies have provided interesting information on individual social perceptions 
using idiographic methods (Null & Bloch, 1988; Prentice, 1990; Andersen & Cole, 1990). 
Prentice (1990) looked at the effect of familiarity on information processing speed and 
organization. Using idiographic methods to solicit information about self, a familiar person 
and an unfamiliar person, the researcher presented people with information from these 
descriptions one week later. Response latency was used to infer how organized and 
accessible these three categories of information were. There were clear differences in 
processing speed for self information versus information about the unfamiliar person.
These differences were matched by information processing of familial' versus unfamiliar 
others.
Andersen and Cole (1990) also used idiographic methods to study the effect of
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organization on information processing. They proposed that important people in one’s life 
were better-organized in the mind of the person. These well-organized person categories 
can influence social perception even more than representations of other categories, such as 
nonsignificant others, stereotypes, or traits. Specific information from each of these 
categories was solicited from subjects. It was found that the cognitive representations of 
important people were richer, more distinctive and more accessible compared to the other 
categories. Recognition was tested after subjects were presented with a fictional person, 
whose description indirectly referred to each type of category (significant others, 
nonsignificant others, stereotypes, and traits). More false-positive errors were made about 
targets who activated significant-other categories. Thus, information processing was 
affected if the stimulus was similar to a significant other. The success of these studies 
should encourage other psychologists to continue using and developing idiographic 
methodology.
The question persists about the accuracy of people’s perceptions and categories. 
This is important because distortion and bias can lead to social misjudgment. Allport 
(1954) wrote about the nature of prejudice and the normality of this process. He suggested 
that erroneous generalization and hostility were natural capacities of the human mind and 
led to categorical prejudgment. Snyder, Tanke & Berscheid (1977) studied the behavioral 
confirmation of social stereotypes in college students. Male subjects were placed in a 
dyadic interaction with a female target who were manipulated to be physically attractive or 
unattractive. The stereotype that beauty implies goodness was manipulated. Conversations 
between the subjects and stimulus revealed that targets who were perceived to be physically 
attractive were also more likeable and friendly. The researchers suggest that social 
cognitive research should attend to the ways in which perceivers generate the information 
which affect their perception and the ways they process that information.
Merton (1948) wrote that “if men define situations as real, they are real in their 
consequences.” In a recent paper, Gilovich (1990) wrote that people’s own beliefs, values
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and habits tend to bias their perceptions of how widely their ideas are shared (the false 
consensus effect). He suggested that people fail to realize their choices are not made from 
all possible alternatives, that sometimes certain alternatives are ignored. This study tested 
whether subjective construal of the alternatives could explain a false consensus effect One 
part of the study established that a larger false consensus effect was produced when the 
situation presented allowed the most amount of subjective construal by being more general 
and less well defined. Another part of the study found that subjects who made different 
choices tended to interpret the response alternatives in ways that reflected the choices they 
made. Also, subjects who were led to construe the alternatives in the same way tended to 
make the same choices. When no structure was provided, people tended to differentiate 
more. These studies suggest a reason why people do not modify their cognitive schemas 
given new information. First of all the incongruous information can be ignored through 
selective attention, because people’s perceptions are organized by their previously existing 
ideas. Secondly, people perceive their ideas to be widely shared which offers security in 
numbers.
More research on systematic bias in perceptions may offer solutions for social 
prejudice. Kenny (1991) developed a model forjudging accuracy in people’s perceptions 
of others. It tests the agreement between two judges about a target stimulus person 
exhibiting certain behaviors. It was found that greater acquaintance with a stimulus 
increased accuracy of perception, but did not increase consensus. The model points to the 
importance of similar meaning systems in determining whether judges will agree in their 
perception of the behavior. Judges’ perceptions may be based on properties that accurately 
describe the stimulus, but judges may not agree on how the stimulus rates on different 
properties. This new model for understanding accuracy and consensus could be used in 
idiographic studies of social perception.
Social constructivist ideas could be applied to clinical research on social adjustment. 
In clinical situations, individual perceptions are very important. For studies of marital
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therapy, people’s conversation may reveal where perceptual differences exist (Moller &Van 
Zyl, 1991). In clinical studies of depression, misperception has been found to increase in 
depressed people. Depressed people’s perceptions are less accurate when compared to the 
reality of their situation. Thompson and Heller (1990) studied the social support available 
and the perception of social support in community-dwelling elderly women. It was found 
that women who perceived themselves as isolated and having litde family support had 
poorer psychological well-being. This perception was distinct from the actual assessment 
of social resources available to them. Attention to individual perceptions is a valuable 
pursuit, because of the connection between accuracy and psychological health.
People have varied cultural backgrounds and socialization experiences which are 
important influences on their beliefs and behavior (Mead, 1934; Goffman, 1955; Bruner, 
1986; Davies, 1989). The personalities of perceivers have a great impact on their 
perceptions of others (Wiggins, Hoffman & Taber, 1969; Wish, Deutsch & Biener, 1970; 
Sherman & Ross, 1972; Markus, 1977; Rogers, Kuiper & Kirker, 1977). A deeper 
understanding of people can be achieved if these aspects are included in scientific inquiry.
In research, the tendency to look for nomothetic principles, or ways of understanding 
everyone, is wide-spread. A true understanding of individuals may not be possible without 
more attention to individuals first. From idiographic analyses, researchers can look for 
underlying principles about person perception. The current study has shown that this is 
possible and suggests that this is a good direction for research to follow.
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APPENDIX A 
COLLEGE OF WILLIAM & MARY 
RESEARCH PARTICIPATION CONSENT FORM
The general nature of this experiment on social schema conducted by Joy Austin 
has been explained to me. I understand that I will be asked about my perceptions of people 
on my hall. I further understand that my anonymity will be preserved and that my name 
will not be associated with my responses or with any results of this study. I know that I 
may refuse to answer any question asked and that I may discontinue participation at any 
time. I also understand that payment for participation will not be affected by my responses 
or by my exercising any of my rights. I am aware that I may report dissatisfaction with any 
aspect of this experiment to the Research Ethics Committee. I understand that in order to 
participate I must be 18 years of age or have my parent or guardian co-sign this consent 
form. My signature below indicates that I am willing to participate in this study.
___________________________  t_____
Date Signature of Student
Parent's Signature (only necessary if student under 18)
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APPENDIX B
N .B . What follows is a hard copy of what subjects saw during data collection, using a 
fictitious group of 3 to demonstrate the procedures.
This is a study concerning perceptions of people in an intact group. The people on your 
dormitory hall will be presented for you to compare. These people are:
Lyn
Chris
Terry
Press any key to continue
Pairs of these people will be presented to you. Please consider the two people and judge 
their similarity.
You will be moving the dash ( - )  along a line to indicate how related the people are. To 
move the dash, use the keys to your right, labeled #6 (to move right) and #4 (to move left). 
If the people seem very similar, move the dash to the far left. If they are totally unrelated, 
move the dash to the far right. Move the dash anywhere along the line so it best represents 
how similar you believe the people to be. When the dash is positioned where you want it, 
press the slash ( /  ) to enter your rating.
There are no right or wrong answers. Please be honest and thoughtful in your responses. 
Let the experimenter know when you have finished this section.
Press any key to continue
similar
Lyn Chris
dissimilar
Chris Terry
similar dissimilar
Terry Lyn
similar dissimilar
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APPENDIX C
Now you will begin the second phase of this study. We are interested in understanding 
what you think are the important characteristics or aspects of the people you have just rated. 
Please list three aspects of the people you compared that you think are very important.
Enter these one per line followed by a return.
Aspect #1 
Aspect #2 
Aspect #3
On the next screen, several several characteristics that might have been used in your ratings 
will appear. The list includes the three you have just entered. You-will'be asked to choose 
the four characteristics that you think were most important while you were making the 
similarity judgments. If you would like to see the list again, type an "r." After looking 
over the list, enter the number of the most important characteristic or aspect.
1 . Aspect #1
2. Aspect #2
3. Aspect #3
4. Good sense of humor
5. Religious
6. Introverted
7. Well-adjusted
8. Athletic
9. Hard to get along with
10. Academically oriented
11. Reserved
12. Physically attractive
13. Intelligent
14. Argumentative
15. Interesting
16. Anxious
17. Manipulative
Press any key to continue
You will now rate each of the people on the characteristic (aspect) you have selected. If the 
person has very little of the characteristic, use the left arrow (key #4) to move the dash (-) 
to the far left. If this aspect is very characteristic of the person, use the right arrow (key 
#6) to move the dash to the far right. Move the dash to the place along the line that best 
represents your rating and then press the slash (/).
Press any key to continue
lOW
Lyn
Physically attractive
high
Chris 
Physically attractive
low high
low
Terry 
Physically attractive
high
low
Lyn
Intelligent
high
Chris
Intelligent
low high
low
Terry
Intelligent
high
Lyn 
Aspect #3
low high
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Chris 
Aspect #3
low high
low
Terry 
Aspect #3
high
low
Lyn
Reserved
high
low
Chris
Reserved
high
low
Terry
Reserved
high
low
Lyn
How conventional is this person's lifestyle and outlook?
high
Chris
How conventional is this person's lifestyle and outlook?
low high
Terry
How conventional is this person's lifestyle and outlook?
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low high
low
Lyn
How friendly or sociable is this person?
high
low
Chris
How friendly or sociable is this person?
high
low
Terry
How friendly or sociable is this person?
high
Lyn
How much does this person control and influence social interaction?
low high
Chris
How much does this person control and influence social interaction?
low high
Terry
How much does this person control and influence social interaction?
low high
low
Lyn
How much does this person allow others to know him/her?
high
71
low
Chris
How much does this person allow others to know him/her?
high
low
Terry
How much does this person allow others to know him/her?
high
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APPENDIX D
Freshm en G roup Study
Background Information
Subject ID: Sex:
Race: Age:
Where do you live when not at college?
Are you in a sorority or fraternity?
If so, which one?
What is your concentration or possible major?
What career might you pursue?
What are your extracurricular activities, hobbies or interests?
Are you dating someone steadily right now?
Circle the number which applies:
1) How socially active are you with the people on your hall?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
Not at all Somewhat Very
2) How satisfied were you in high school in relationships with friends of the same 
sex?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  '
Not at all Somewhat Very
3) How satisfied were you in high school in relationships with friends of the
opposite sex?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
Not at all Somewhat Very
4) How satisfied are you now in relationships with friends of the same sex?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
Not at all Somewhat Very
5) How satisfied are you now in relationships with friends of the opposite sex?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Not at all Somewhat Very
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Rank the people in your group according to who your closest friends are. Begin 
your list with the name of the person you consider your best friend in the group and end 
the list with the person you are least friendly with. In the column headed FRIENDS, put 
a check by the names of people you consider your friends and a zero by the names of 
people you don't consider your friends. Refer to the list of people in your group, so you 
can write their whole name and include everyone in the group.
NAME FRIENDS
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
10)
11)
12)
13)
14)
15)
16)
17)
18)
19)
20)
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